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"Objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be intro-
duced in evidence."' Police officers properly executing a lawfully issued
search warrant may, therefore, seize incriminating evidence not de-
scribed in the warrant if they discover the item in plain sight. When
gathered during the course of a conventional search, such plain view evi-
dence is admissible at trial. 2 If investigators determine that a conven-
tional search will be ineffective, federal law3 and statutes in thirty-two
states and the District of Columbia4 authorize investigators to turn to
electronic surveillance as an evidence-gathering tool. When plain view
1 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); see infra notes 16-35 and accompanying
text.
2 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465, 515 (1971). See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730 (1982). See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
3 See infra note 11.
4 See infra note 190.
evidence is gathered during electronic surveillance, however, the evi-
dence may or may not be admissible in a subsequent judicial
proceeding.5
In 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act.6 Title III permits law enforcement officers to inter-
cept communications by means of electronic surveillance pursuant to a
properly issued court order authorizing the surveillance, but it requires
compliance with its strict statutory guidelines concerning the execution
of the order.7 Under Title III, states wishing to grant authority to con-
duct electronic surveillance must enact specific statutes that meet the
minimum privacy protections set by Title 1M1.8 One of the statutory re-
quirements of a properly issued surveillance order is that the order con-
tain "a particular description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it re-
lates." 9 In executing a surveillance order, however, law enforcement of-
ficers commonly intercept incriminating communications that are
unrelated to the crimes described in the order. 10 Both Congress" and a
5 See infra notes 128-88, 196-204 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state law gov-
erning the admissibility of plain view evidence gathered by electronic surveillance).
6 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988)) [hereinafter
Title III or by section]. The legislative history of Title III is found in S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2180 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1097].
Important general background is also found in NAT'L COMM'N, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAP-
PING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1976) [hereinafter 1976 REPORT]; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SUR-
VEILLANCE (1968) [hereinafter 1968 ABA STANDARDS]. See also J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE (1977) [hereinafter CARR]; Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III Reuriting The Law
of Electronic Surveillance, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1983) [hereinafter Goldsmith]; C. FISHMAN,
EAVESDROPPING AND WIRETAPPING (1978 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter FISHMAN].
7 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2519 (1988). See also infra notes 36-127 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
9 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(c) (1988).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Depolina,
461 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); People v. DiStefano, 38 N.Y.2d 640, 382 N.Y.S.2d 5, 345 N.E.2d
548 (1976); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971), af'd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United States v. Denisio, 360 F. Supp. 715 (D.Md. 1973);
United States v. Tortorello, 342 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970). Two types
of plain view evidence may be discovered during electronic surveillance: evidence incriminating a
person not named in the original surveillance order and evidence ofa crime not specified in the origi-
nal surveillance order. This Note considers the admissibility of only the later type of electronically
gathered plain view evidence.
11 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1988). See also S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2189; United States v.
DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 825 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying § 2517(5) of Title III to admit
intercepted information relating to several offenses not included in any of five original surveillance
orders authorizing wiretaps to obtain evidence of various state and federal crimes constituting a
"pattern of racketeering activity" in violation of the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act of 1970 and securities fraud and bankruptcy fraud conspiracies); United States v.
Skarloff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 307 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aft'd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
847 (1975) (upholding against fourth amendment challenge, the constitutionality of Title III's exten-
sion of the plain view doctrine to electronic surveillance: "It is settled law in search and seizure cases
that certain items not named in the search warrant may be seized if discovered in the course of a
lawful search.... [Section 2517(5)] is only a re-statement of existing case law adapted to fit the
electronic surveillance situation." (citations omitted)); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295,
300-01 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (upholding the constitutionality of § 2517(5), Title III's plain view
provision).
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number of the state legislatures1 2 have, in varying degrees, extended the
plain view doctrine to electronic searches by enacting provisions that au-
thorize the disclosure of the contents of such incriminating communica-
tions as evidence in criminal proceedings.
Nonetheless, Title III and the majority of state statutes impose pro-
cedural prerequisites upon the admissibility of electronically-intercepted
plain view evidence beyond fourth amendment requirements for the ad-
missibility of plain view evidence seized in a conventional search. Fur-
ther, due to the intrusive nature of electronic surveillance, some federal
courts 13 and some commentators14 question whether the plain view doc-
trine should be applied to electronic searches at all. Accordingly, elec-
tronic surveillance law in several states further restricts the admissibility
of electronically-gathered plain view evidence. These states provide that
such evidence is per se inadmissible or limit admissibility to communica-
tions involving only certain crimes.' 5
Part I of this Note discusses the development and present state of
the plain view doctrine. Parts II and III examine the admissibility of in-
tercepted conversations relating to crimes not described in the surveil-
lance order (plain view interceptions) under federal and state law. Part
IV argues that these conversations should be admissible as evidence in
court without unnecessary procedural prerequisites or restrictions. It as-
serts that such procedures and restrictions further no significant fourth
amendment or individual privacy concerns, considering the current state
of the plain view doctrine and the substantial privacy safeguards required
of all surveillance statutes. Therefore, electronic surveillance statutes
that impose limits on the admissibility of plain view interceptions place
unnecessary burdens on law enforcement and should be reformed. Part
V concludes that these legislative reforms are especially necessary in
light of the contemporary prevalence of organized, narcotics-related
crime.
I. The Plain View Doctrine
For many years, the Supreme Court held that plain view seizures
violated the fourth amendment's particularity requirement and were pro-
hibited as "unreasonable" seizures.' 6 According to the Court, "a cardi-
12 See infra notes 196-204 and accompanying text.
13 See e.g., United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 605 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cox, 449
F.2d 679, 686 (10th cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1971).
14 See, e.g., Note, Subsequent Use of Electronic Surveillance Interceptions and the Plain View Doctrine:
Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 9 MICn. J.L. REF. 529, 540-53 (1976);
CARR, supra note 6, § 5.9(b).
15 See infra notes 196-204 and accompanying text.
16 The fourth amendment of the Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and persons or things to be seized.
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nal principle"' 17 of fourth amendment law is that "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magis-
trate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' 8 In or-
der to meet fourth amendment requirements, a judicially approved
search warrant must contain language "particularly describing the place
to be searched, and persons or things to be seized."' 19 In its 1927 deci-
sion in Marron v. United States,20 the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment's particularity requirement restricted seizures made while
executing a search warrant to only those particular items described in the
warrant.2
1
Proponents of Marron felt that the opinion stated an integral compo-
nent of the fourth amendment's proscription of general searches. 22 They
argued that, but for Marron, there would be no incentive for officers to
stop searching even after seizing all the items described in the warrant.23
Nonetheless, as years passed, the Court upheld several plain view
seizures made in the course of lawful warrantless searches.2 4 These cases
raised doubt as to the continued validity of Marron.25 Eventually, in Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire,26 it was recoguized that "[iut is at least odd to...
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (emphasis added) (the italicized language contains the "particularity" re-
quirement).
The remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment is
exclusion of evidence seized or derived from the unreasonable search. The Supreme Court created
the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and extended the fourth
amendment right of privacy to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), and extended the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
17 Mincey v. Arizona, 347 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
18 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The "specifically established and well-deline-
ated exceptions" include: hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); exigent circum-
stances, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951); automobile searches, United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); search of the person and surrounding area incident to arrest, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); search at the U.S. border or a "functional equivalent," Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); and consent, Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630
(1946).
19 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
20 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
21 The Marron majority stated that "[tihe requirement that warrants shall particularly describe
that thing to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of
one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the
discretion of the officers executing the warrant." Id. at 196.
22 See, e.g., Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order", 67
MICH. L. REv. 455, 465-66 (1969).
23 Id
24 See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1947); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,
238-40 (1960); United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1962);
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 235-36 (1968).
25 See, Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 141 & n.843.
26 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined injustice Stewart's plu-
rality opinion. In Coolidge, police went to Coolidge's home to arrest him for murder. They had
previously obtained a warrant to search Coolidge's automobile. The police chief applied for the
warrant and the warrant was issued by the Attorney General who was in charge of the investigation
and was to be the chief prosecutor of the case against Coolidge. When the police arrived at the
Coolidge house to arrest the suspect, his car was parked in the driveway. The police arrested Coo-
lidge and towed his car to the police station where the car was subsequently searched. The prosecu-
tion offered vacuum sweepings from the car as evidence at the trial. The vacuum sweepings were
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permit plain-sight seizures arising in connection with warrantless arrests
... and yet forbid the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain sight when
officers enter a house under a search warrant that is perfectly valid but
does not cover the items actually seized." '27
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Coolidge held that plain view
seizures, including those made pursuant to a warrant, comply with the
fourth amendment when three conditions are met: (1) the seizing officer
had prior justification for the initial intrusion;28 (2) "it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them;" 29 and (3)
the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent.2 0 The courts
accepted into evidence over the defendant's pretrial suppression motion and Coolidge was con-
victed. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and Coolidge appealed. The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded. A plurality of the Court held
that the search warrant was invalid under the fourth amendment because it was not issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate. After discussing the requirements for a search and seizure under
the plain view doctrine, the plurality concluded that the seizure and subsequent search of Coolidge's
car could not be justified under the plain view doctrine because the discovery of the car at Coolidge's
home was not "inadvertent."
27 Id. at 515 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
28 Id. at 466. "The [plain view] doctrine serves to supplement the priorjustification-whether it
be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legiti-
mate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused-and permits
the warrantless seizure." Id.; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Cady, the Court upheld
the plain view seizure of some blood-stained garments later used to convict the defendant of murder.
The defendant was a policeman who was involved in an auto accident, arrested for drunk driving and
taken to a hospital for treatment. The defendant's car was towed to a private garage where police
searched the car for the defendant's service revolver to prevent it from falling into the hands of
vandals. During the search for the pistol, the police discovered and seized the blood-stained gar-
ments. The Court held that the initial intrusion was justified as a "community caretaking function."
Therefore, the seizure of the garments was also justified.
29 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 466. Justice Stewart emphasized that "the plain view
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerged." Id
"Immediately apparent" means that the police officer has probable cause to believe that the
item in plain view is incriminating in nature. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-43 (1982). See also
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1987) (holding that probable cause is required to invoke the
plain view doctrine to justify a seizure).
30 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 469. Commentators have noted that this third re-
quirement implies good faith as a fourth requirement. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 146 &
n.870. Support for this proposition is found in Coolidge:
The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement, [see infra text accompanying
notes 32-34], is that a plain-view seizure will not turn an initially valid (and therefore lim-
ited) search into a "general" one, while the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover
an inadvertent discovery is great. But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police
know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is alto-
gether different. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience
whatever, or at least none of which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that re-
gards warrantless searches as "per se unreasonable" in the absence of "exigent
circumstances."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 469-71. In a footnote, Justice Stewart explained further
that: "This Court has never permitted the legitimation of a planned warrantless seizure on plain-
view grounds.... [T]he mere fact that the police have legitimately obtained a plain view of a piece of
incriminating evidence is not enough to justify a warrantless seizure." Id. at 471 n.27. Addressing
the plurality's concern for "planned warrantless searches," Justice White stated that:
If the police have probable cause to search for a photograph as well as a rifle and they
proceed to seek a warrant, they could have no possible motive for deliberately including the
rifle but omitting the photograph. Quite the contrary is true. Only oversight or careless
mistake would explain the omission in the warrant application if the police were convinced
they had probable cause to search for the photograph. Of course, they may misjudge the
facts and not realize they have probable cause for the picture, or the magistrate may find
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have applied requirements (1) and (2) in subsequent plain view cases, but
have questioned the necessity of the inadvertent discovery require-
ment.31 The Coolidge plurality rationalized the plain view doctrine as an
against them and not issue a warrant for it. In either event [under the inadvertent discovery
rule] the officers may validly seize [a second] photograph for which they had no probable
cause to search [but discovered inadvertently] but [the original] photograph [discovered in
plain view] is excluded from evidence [if] the court subsequently determines that the of-
ficers, after all, had probable cause to search for it.
l. at 517 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White called the situation
described above, "a punitive and extravagant application of the exclusionary rule." Idl
31 In Coolidge, only a plurality of the Court recognized the inadvertent discovery requirement.
Justices Black and White criticized the inadvertency requirement in their respective concurring and
dissenting opinions. Justice Black attacked the plurality's basis for the inadvertent discovery
requirement:
The majority [sic] confidently states: "What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that
the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused." But the
prior holdings of this Court not only fail to support the majority's statement, they flatly
contradict it. One need look no further than the cases cited in the majority opinion to
discover the invalidity of that assertion.
Id. at 506 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White took an even stronger opposition to
the inadvertency requirement, writing that "the inadvertence rule is unnecessary to further any
Fourth'Amendment ends and will accomplish nothing." Id. at 517 (White, J., concurring and dis-
senting). Justice White supports his assertion with a well reasoned argument:
Police with a warrant for a rifle may search only places where rifles might be and must
terminate the search once the rifle is found; the inadvertence rule will in no way reduce the
number of places into which they may lawfully look. So, too, the areas of permissible search
incident to arrest are strictly circumscribed by [Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)].
Excluding evidence seen from within these areas can hardly be effective to operate to pre-
vent wider unauthorized searches. If the police stray outside the scope of an authorized...
search they are already in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence so seized will
be excluded; adding a second reason for excluding evidence hardly seems worth the candle.
id
In subsequent cases, members of the Court have questioned the continued validity of the inad-
vertent discovery requirement. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737, 743-44 (1982); Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1987) (White, J., concurring). Some lower federal courts have also
noted the uncertain status of the inadvertent discovery requirement and refused to accept it as a
constitutional element of the plain view doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 555
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1101 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974). Cf. United States v.
Ladson, 774 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979).
Given the criticism of the inadvertent discovery requirement, it is probably safe to assume that
future plain view seizures will be upheld when there is a valid initial intrusion and the officers have
probable cause to believe that the item in plain view is incriminating in nature, even if officers had a
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe they would find the item in plain view. Only in
cases where there was a clear lack of good faith on the part of the officer, and the original search
warrant was a mere pretext to allow police to make a plain view discovery is a court likely to find a
plain view seizure unreasonable..
For further discussion of the inadvertent discovery requirement see The Supreme Court: 1970
Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3 (1971) (stating that the most serious problem with the plurality's opinion in
Coolidge was the absence of an explanation of the degree of expectation of discovery that would
violate the inadvertence requirement and discussing the implications of the requirement when the
prohibited degree of expectation is set at probable cause and at something less than probable cause)
and Lewis & Mannle, Warrantless Searches and the "Plain View" Doctrine: Current Perspective, 12 CRIM. L.
BULL. 5 (1976) (warning that uncertainty of the requirements of the plain view doctrine and espe-
cially the inadvertence requirement has left the law in a state that invites subterfuge searches and
false testimony by police).
For a more recent discussion of the inadvertency requirement, see United States v. Liberti, 616
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1980). In Liberti, the majority held that a plain-view seizure is "inadvertent" when
the officer lacks probable cause to search for and seize the item. In his concurring opinion, Judge
Newman wrote:
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exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, similar to the
"hot pursuit" and search incident to lawful arrest exceptions.3 2
Nonetheless, in Texas v. Brown, 33 Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White and O'Connor joined in Justice Rhenquist's plurality opinion to
The "inadvertence" qualification to the doctrine of"plain view" seizures was endorsed
in [Coolidge] by only four Justices and was rejected as unsound in that same case by four
Justices. The uncertain status of the "inadvertence" notion has been noted by this Court
•.. and others....
The majority [rests its] decision on the ground that a "plain view seizure" of an item
not covered by a search warrant is "inadvertent" when officers lack probable cause to search
for and seize that item. That approach creates the anomaly that a householder's interest in
protecting his goods from seizure is made to turn on his ability to prove that the officers had
probable cause, while the officers authority to seize depends upon their successful disclaimer
of probable cause. The reversal of traditional roles on the issue of probable cause suggests
that making "inadvertence" turn on the absence of probable cause may be unsound. More-
over, this approach places the householder in the position of probing for law enforcement
information and thereby risking the integrity of continuing criminal investigations in order
to prove the presence of probable cause, a matter not normally within his knowledge.
Perhaps these anomalies put in issue the basic soundness of the "inadvertence"
qualification.
Id. at 38.
32 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 467-68. Justice Stewart wrote that:
The rationale for the "plain view" exception is evident if we keep in mind the two distinct
constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement. First, the magistrate's scru-
tiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause.... The
second, distinct objective is that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as
possible. Here, the specific evil is the "general warrant" abhorred by the colonists, and the
problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a per-
son's belongings.... The warrant accomplishes this second objective by requiring a "par-
ticular description" of things to be seized.
The "plain view" doctrine does not conflict with the first objective because plain view
does not occur until a search is in progress. In each case, this initial intrusion is justified by
a warrant or by an exception such as "hot pursuit" or search incident to a lawful arrest, or
by an extraneous valid reason for the officer's presence. And, given the initial intrusion, the
seizure of an object in plain view is consistent with the second objective, since it does not
convert the search into a general or exploratory one. As against the minor peril to Fourth
Amendment protections, there is a major gain in effective law enforcement. Where, once
an otherwise lawful search is in progress, the police inadvertently come upon a piece of
evidence, it would be a needless inconvenience, and sometimes dangerous-to the evidence
or to the police themselves-to require them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant
particularly describing it.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
33 460 U.S. 730 (1982). In Brown, a Fort Worth, Texas police officer stopped Brown's car at a
routine driver's license checkpoint. It was about midnight and Brown was alone in the car. As the
officer stood alongside the driver's window of the car and shined his flashlight into the car, he asked
to see Brown's driver's license. The officer noticed that a green party balloon, knotted about one-
half inch from the tip, had caught between Brown's two middle fingers as he withdrew his right hand
from his right pants pocket. Brown let the balloon fall on the seat beside him as he reached into the
glove compartment. The police officer recognized the balloon as the type commonly used to pack-
age narcotics. When Brown opened the glove compartment, the officer adjusted his flashlight so
that he could see inside. He noticed that the compartment contained several small plastic vials,
some loose white powder, and an open bag of party balloons. After looking in his glove compart-
ment, Brown told the officer that he did not have his driver's license. The officer instructed Brown
to get out of the car. When Brown got out, the officer reached into the car and picked up the green
balloon that seemed to contain a powdery substance. The officer then arrested Brown, conducted an
on-the-scene inventory search of the car, and seized the other items. Brown's motion to suppress
the evidence was denied, and Brown was convicted. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
the conviction, holding that the plain view doctrine could not justify the seizure of the balloon be-
cause the police officer did not know that he had incriminating evidence before him when he seized it.
Therefore, the incriminating nature of the balloon was not "immediately apparent" as required by
the plain view doctrine enunciated in Coolidge. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded
holding that the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge requires only that the police have
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delineate a different rationale for the plain view doctrine. After pointing
out that the Coolidge plurality's formulation of the plain view doctrine
"has never been expressly adopted by a majority of [the] Court," the
Brown plurality stated that:
"[P]lain view" provides grounds for seizure of an item when an of-
ficer's access to an object has some priorjustification under the Fourth
Amendment. "Plain view" is perhaps better understood, therefore, not as an
independent "exception" to the Warrant Clause, but simply as an extension of
whatever the prior justification for an officer's "access to an object" may be....
[O]ur decisions have come to reflect the rule that if, while lawfully en-
gaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a sus-
picious object, they may seize it immediately .... This rule merely
reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment's central require-
ment of reasonableness to the law governing seizure of property.8 4
The plurality opinions in Coolidge and Brown, taken together, constitute
the modem formulation of the plain view doctrine.3 5 These decisions
establish that plain view seizures comply with the fourth amendment if
the officer's initial access to the item seized is constitutionally valid and
the officer has probable cause to believe the item in plain view is incrimi-
nating in nature.
II. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5): Federal Law Governing the Admissibility of
Plain View Evidence Derived Through Electronic Surveillance
Before examining the interplay between the plain view doctrine and
electronic searches and seizures, a general understanding of the body of
law pertaining to electronic surveillance is necessary. Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is a comprehensive
federal statute governing the authorization and execution of electronic
surveillance orders and the admissibility of evidence derived from elec-
tronic surveillance. This Part provides an overview of the major provi-
sions of Title III that are relevant to plain view interceptions. These
provisions establish substantial privacy safeguards against the inherent
intrusiveness of electronic surveillance. This Part also examines 18
U.S.C. § 2517(5), Title III's provision governing the admissibility of
communications relating to crimes not described in the surveillance
order.
A. Title III Generally
Title III is the product of extensive debate concerning the utility of
electronic surveillance in criminal investigations and the merits of vari-
probable cause to believe that the item in plain view is of an incriminating nature; "immediately
apparent" does not require that the officer "know" the item in plain view is incriminating.
34 Id at 737-39 (emphasis added).
35 The most recent Supreme Court case to address the plain view doctrine is Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321 (1987). Hicks held that probable cause is required to invoke the plain view doctrine as
ajustification for the seizure of property. Hicks reinforced by majority opinion the Brown plurality's
definition of "immediately apparent" as an equivalent to a requirement of probable cause. Beyond
that holding, however, Hicks appeared to merely recognize the plain view doctrine as formulated by
Coolidge and Brown.
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ous legal controls.3 6 The statute is best characterized as "a conscious
compromise forged by Congress between competing privacy and law en-
forcement concerns. " 7 Generally, Title III permits law enforcement of-
ficers to use wiretaps and bugs3 8 in criminal investigations pursuant to a
properly issued court order authorizing the surveillance, and requires of-
ficers to comply with the statute's guidelines concerning the execution of
the order.3 9 Thus, Title III serves two purposes. First, it enhances law
enforcement by permitting the use of electronic surveillance as an inves-
tigatory tool. Second, Title III protects individual privacy by imposing
strict limitations on the permitted use of electronic surveillance. In
1976, the Wiretap Commission concluded that, with respect to law en-
forcement, electronic surveillance is:
(1) an indispensable aid to law enforcement, (2) primarily useful in
investigation of organized-crime-type offenses, including narcotics and
gambling, (3) not used, but should be, in theft and fencing and other
"creative investigations," and (4) best used by experienced prosecu-
tors and well-trained criminal investigators. 40
One of the most feared results of legalizing electronic surveillance is
the creation of an Orwellian society in which "Big Brother" monitors our
every move. However, statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2519(1) consistently
show that the extent of law enforcement agencies' use of electronic sur-
veillance is far from Orwellian. In fact, the 1987 statistics indicate that
law enforcement agencies across the country have largely neglected this
"indispensable aid." 4 1
36 CARR, supra note 6, § 2.1.
37 Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 3.
38 "Wiretapping generally refers to the interception (and recording) of a communication transmit-
ted over a wire from a telephone, without the consent of any of the participants. Bugging generally
refers to the interception (and recording) of a communication transmitted orally without consent of
any of the participants." 1976 REPORT supra, note 6. See also CARR, supra note 6, §§ 1.1(a), 1.1(b).
Interestingly, the constitutional basis for federal regulation of wiretapping and bugging are differ-
ent. The commerce clause of the Constitution provides authority for federal control of wiretapping,
apparently due to the interstate nature of telephone communications. Id. § 2.3(a). Federal authority
to control bugging, however, originates in the fourth amendment's protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment by Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Id. § 2.3(b).
39 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2519 (1988) and infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
40 1976 REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-6. See also CARR, supra note 6, § 4.1, at 4-3 n.2; W. LAFAvE &J.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.2 (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ISRAEL].
41 A total of only 673 surveillance orders were authorized by the 33 jurisdictions which had
enacted surveillance statutes during or before calendar year 1987. Two-hundred and thirty-six of
those orders were authorized by the federal government, and approximately 80% of the remaining
437 surveillance orders were authorized by only nine of the 32 other jurisdictions having surveil-
lance statutes: NewJersey (144 orders authorized), New York (88 orders authorized), Pennsylvania
(44 orders authorized), Massachusetts (28 orders authorized), Connecticut (21 orders authorized),
Maryland (20 orders authorized), Texas (18 orders authorized), Florida (18 orders authorized), and
Nebraska (13 orders authorized). Perhaps the most startling statistic from 1987 is that 11 of the 33
jurisdictions in which electronic surveillance is a lawful investigatory tool did not even authorize a
single surveillance order. Among these 11 jurisdictions was the District of Columbia. REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1987 TO DECEMBER 31, 1987. [hereinafter 1987 REPORT]. Considering
the findings stated in the 1976 REPORT and the recent rise in narcotics-related crime, the failure to
fully utilize electronic surveillance in criminal investigations is disturbing.
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Title III subjects the authorization and execution of electronic sur-
veillance to a much more demanding degree ofjudicial scrutiny than the
authorization and execution of a conventional search receives. Title III
is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. Four general categories of its pro-
visions are relevant here: (1) provisions effecting the statute's scope; (2)
provisions governing the authorization of electronic surveillance; (3)
provisions regulating the execution of electronic surveillance; and (4)
provisions establishing suppression as a remedy for violations of the stat-
ute. The main thrust of these provisions is to establish restrictions on
the employment of electronic surveillance as a check against its inherent
intrusiveness.
1. The Scope of Title III
The scope of federal and state electronic surveillance statutes is es-
tablished by their often ambiguous definitions, specific provisions per-
taining to certain uses of electronic surveillance, and interpretative case
law. Methods outside the surveillance statute's scope may be used to
gather evidence without a court order and without fear of criminal or
civil penalties under the statute. Nonetheless, these methods are subject
to constitutional and any other applicable statutory provisions pertaining
to privacy, search and seizure, trespass, etc. Since Title III serves as the
model for state electronic surveillance statutes, the provisions of Title III
provide a logical starting point for considering the scope of electronic
surveillance law generally.
a. Scope as Determined by Statutory Definitions
Tide III prohibits interception and disclosure of any wire, oral, or
electronic communications, except as provided within 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
Section 2510(4) defines "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of
the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 42 Interception in-
volves use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device by an individual
to overhear any communication in which he is neither a participant nor
an intended listener.43 "[E]lectronic, mechanical, or other device"
means "any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire,
oral, or electronic communication other than" any of the following: a
telephone or telegraph instrument furnished to the user by a provider of
wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of busi-
ness; such an instrument used by a communications common carrier in
the ordinary course of business, or by investigative or law enforcement
officers in the ordinary course of their duties; or, a hearing aid used to
correct subnormal hearing.44
Activities that do not constitute "the aural acquisition of the con-
tents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication" are outside the
scope of Title III and may be conducted without a Title III court order or
42 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1988).
43 United States v. Banks, 374 F. Supp. 321, 326 (D.S.D. 1974).
44 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(5)(a), (b) (1988).
1990] NOTE
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
fear of Title III sanctions. Such activities include examination of toll or
similar records compiled by phone companies, including their disclo-
sure45, or use of a pen register.46 Trap and trace devices47 are outside
the scope of Title 111,48 as are beepers or "mobile tracking devices" 49
used by law enforcement officers as an aid to physical surveillance of sus-
pects and moving vehicles,50 unaided overhearing,5 1 monitoring of in-
coming calls by police,5 2 inadvertent interception, 53 and replay of
previously recorded communications. 54
As defined in section 2510(1), "wire communications" means:
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities
for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or
like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception
(including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished
or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such
facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications
or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such
term includes any electronic storage of such communication, but does
not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication
that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the
base unit.55
An aural transfer is "a transfer containing a human voice at any point
between and including the point of origin and the point of reception. '5 6
45 United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 167 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974);
Nolan v. United States, 432 F.2d 1031, 1044 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970); CARR,
supra note 6, § 3.2(c)(2)(A).
46 A pen register is a device that "records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify
the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such a device is at-
tached." 18 U.S.C. § 3126(3) (1988). See S. REP. No. 1097,supra note 6, at 2178; Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979); United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1, 162
(1977).
47 These are devices that "capture the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the
originating number of the instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was
transmitted." 18 U.S.C. § 3126(4) (1988).
48 "[I]n light of Smith v. Maryland and United States v. New York Telephone Co., no prior court order
appears constitutionally mandated before a trap and trace device can be installed at the request of
law enforcement officers, [and] Congress enacted legislation in 1986 ... establishing procedures for
obtainingjudicial approval for installation of a trap and trace." CARR, supra note 6, § 3.2(c)(3)(C), at
3-26 (footnotes omitted).
49 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (1988).
50 United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 110 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that since tracking devices
broadcast only a radio signal and cannot transmit speech they do not intercept communication);
CARR, supra note 6, § 3.2(c)(2)(D).
51 Unaided overhearing is "not within proposed legislation." S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at
2178.
52 Commonwealth v. Smith, 186 Pa. Super. 89, 140 A.2d 347, 350 (1958) (holding that the
speaker chose to talk to the person who answered the phone and thereby assumed the risk that it was
someone other than the person whom he thought it was; consequently, the speaker does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy). See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52(b)( 8) (Baldwin 1987) and
Wyo. STAT. § 7-3-602(b)(vii) (1987), both of which expressly permit warrantless monitoring of in-
coming calls.
53 See CARR, supra note 6, § 3.2(c)(2)(G), at 3-32.
54 United States v. Felton, 753 F.2d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d
1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Brown v. Superior Court, 127 Cal.
App. 3d 155, 180 Cal. Rptr. 206, 214 (1981).
55 18 U.S.C. § 2510(l) (1988).
56 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18) (1988).
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According to Title III's legislative history, "[t]he coverage is intended to
be comprehensive." 57
Section 2510(2) defines "oral communication[s]" as those "uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such an expecta-
tion, but such term does not include any electronic communication."58
Thus, to fall within the scope of this definition, oral communication must
be (1) spoken by a person exhibiting an expectation that his words are
not subject to interception; and (2) spoken in circumstances making the
speaker's expectation reasonable. The legislative history provides that
the definition of oral communication is "intended to reflect existing
law."' 59 Therefore, section 2510(2) must be read in the context of Katz v.
United States60 and other federal cases interpreting the fourth amend-
ment. In Katz, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment pro-
tects persons against unreasonable searches and seizures when they are
exhibiting a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable. 61 Katz was obviously the basis for Title III's definition of
oral communication. The statute excludes from its scope any communi-
cation not meeting the statutory/Katz test and "any electronic communi-
cation," as defined at section 2510(12) and section 2510(2).
Section 2510(12) defines "electronic communications" as "any
transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence
of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electro-
magnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate
or foreign commerce .... -62 According to the legislative history, "a
communication is an electronic communication if it is not carried by
sound waves and cannot fairly be characterized as containing the human
voice. Communication consisting solely of data, for example, and all
communications transmitted only by radio are electronic communica-
tions, as are electronic mail, digitalized transmissions, and video telecon-
ferences." 63 The statutory definition goes on to exclude:
57 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2178.
58 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1988).
59 5. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2178 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
60 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was convicted of a federal offense for transmitting wagering infor-
mation by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston. Over Katz's objection, the District
Court considered evidence of Katz's end of telephone conversations, which the FBI had, without
prior judicial authorization, intercepted by attaching a bug to the outside of the public telephone
booth from which Katz had placed his calls. The Government argued that the interception did not
constitute a fourth amendment search and seizure because the agents had not physically penetrated
the phone booth in making the interception. The Court held that a physical intrusion of the phone
booth was not necessary to constitute a search and seizure under the fourth amendment: "[The
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places .. ." Id. at 351. "ITihe Fourth Amendment gov-
erns not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements,
overheard without any 'technical trespass under.., local property law.'" Id. at 353. Since investi-
gators seized Katz's conversation without prior approval of a neutral and detached magistrate, the
Court ruled that the District Court had erred in admitting the conversations in evidence and re-
versed Katz's conviction.
61 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
62 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988).
63 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 4, at 18 (Supp. 1987).
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(A) the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is
transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit;
(B) any wire or oral communication;
(C) any communication made through a tone-only paging device; or
(D) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section
3117 of this title).64
b. Specific Statutory Provisions and Case Law Limiting the Scope of Title III
Title III contains a number of provisions that directly or indirectly
exempt certain uses of electronic surveillance from the statute. For ex-
ample, provisions permitting telephone companies, and other providers
of communications services, to conduct electronic surveillance narrow
the scope of Title III. When conducted by such providers, activities in-
volving maintenance of toll records, use of pen registers and other call
tracing devices are not within the meaning of "intercept." 65
The principal exception from the scope of Title III's regulatory
framework is the authority to conduct consent surveillance. Sections
2511(2)(c) & (d),66 grant this authority to law enforcement officers and to
persons not acting under color of law. Title III's legislative history indi-
cates that these exceptions are intended to reflect existing fourth amend-
ment law upholding warrantless consent surveillance. 67 The legislative
history also indicates that only a person participating in the conversation
can give effective consent to surveillance.68
National security surveillance is also outside the scope of Title III.
When Title III was enacted in 1968, it contained a provision that pro-
vided that nothing in Title III "shall limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
Nation against actual or potential attack or hostile acts of a foreign power
.... "69 This provision was repealed when Congress enacted the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which now governs the procedures
for lawful national security surveillance. 70
Intra-family interceptions are generally beyond the reach of elec-
tronic surveillance statutes. Cases involving interception of the commu-
nications of one family member by another typically arise in the context
of spousal disputes and divorces. They sometimes occur when a parent
seeks to monitor a child's communications and conversations. Since Ti-
64 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988).
65 See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text; CARR, supra note 6, § 3.3, at 3-42 to 3-54.
66 Under Title III's consent exceptions law enforcement authorities are free to make consensual
interceptions in a variety of ways: (1) by having the consenting party wear or carry a tape recorder
with which he records his face-to-face conversations with another; (2) by having the consenting party
wear a transmitter that broadcasts his conversations to agents equipped with a receiver; or (3) by
having the consenting party to a telephone conversation record it or permit another to listen in on
an extension. CARR, supra note 6, § 3.5, at 3-55 to 3-62; LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 4.3(c), at
228.
67 See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
68 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2182.
69 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (repealed 1978).
70 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 4.3(d), at 228-30.
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tie III is structured to absolutely prohibit third person surveillance,71
subject only to the enume-ated exceptions, 72 and intra-family surveil-
lance is not among these exceptions, the use of electronic or other de-
vices in these cases dearly qualifies as an interception under section
2510(4). Nonetheless, many courts will not apply the statute literally and
hold such surveillance to be outside the scope of Title III. Courts reach
this conclusion based on the doctrine of spousal immunity, the legislative
history of Title III, and by classifying parental use of an extension tele-
phone to listen secretly to conversations as normal use under section2510(5)(a)(i). 7s
In certain circumstances, Title III exempts emergency surveillance
from the requirement of prior judicial authorization. Under section
2518(7), electronic surveillance may be conducted without judicial ap-
proval when an emergency situation exists involving "(i) immediate dan-
ger of death or serious physical injury to any person, (ii) conspirital
activities characteristic of organized crime that requires wire or oral com-
munication to be intercepted before an order authorizing such intercep-
tion can with due diligence be obtained." 74
Title III also exempts certain activities by Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) employees. Under section 2511(2)(b), an employee
of the FCC may "in the normal course of his employment," intercept and
disclose the contents of wire, electronic, and oral communications trans-
mitted by radio. 75
Title III does not cover use of video equipment when a video record
is created, used, or disclosed. Nonetheless, if officers record both sounds
and sights, the statute applies to the audio portion of the videotape.76
2. Authorization Provisions
a. Crimes for Which Court-Ordered Electronic Surveillance May Be Employed
as an Investigatory Tool
Under Title III, a surveillance order authorizing the interception of
wire and oral communications can issue to aid in investigations of only
those offenses designated in section 2516(1). The federal offenses that
can be investigated pursuant to this provision are roughly divided into
three categories: (1) national security offenses; (2) intrinsically danger-
ous crimes; and (3) activities characteristic of organized crime. 77 Section
71 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l) (1988).
72 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (1988).
73 CARR, supra note 6, § 3.6, at 3-94 & 3-95.
74 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1988). Before beginning surveillance under § 2518(7), the law enforce-
ment officer must be satisfied that "there are grounds upon which an order could be entered" under
Title III. Further, the officer must apply for a Title Ill court order within forty-eight hours after the
interception begins. Id.
75 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(b) (1988).
76 The conversations are oral communications pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1988). CARR,
supra note 6, § 3.8, at 3-105.
77 See CARR, supra note 6, § 4.2(a), at 4-4 & 4-4.1.
Section 2516(l)(a) authorizes surveillance orders in the case of any offense punishable by death
or imprisonment for more than one year relating to enforcement of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel, espionage, sabotage, treason, riots, malicious mischief, destruc-
tion of vessels, or piracy. Section 2516(l)(b) authorizes orders for violation of restrictions on pay-
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2516(1)(1) permits surveillance of conspiracies to commit any of the enu-
merated offenses.
b. The Application
Under section 2518(1), applications for a surveillance order must be
made in writing, on oath or affirmation, and state the applicants' author-
ity to make the application. Each application must also contain the iden-
tity of the investigative or law enforcement officers applying for the
surveillance order and the officer authorizing the application, 78 and a full
and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the
applicant to justify his belief that an order should be issued and to estab-
lish probable cause. 79 The probable cause statement must include four
elements: (1) the offense being investigated; (2) the facilities or place
from which interception is to occur; (3) the type of communications to be
intercepted; and (4) the identity of the person to be overheard.80 Each of
ments and loans to labor organizations, murder, kidnapping, robbery, or extortion. Section
2516(l)(c) authorizes orders for investigation of crimes involving bribery of public officials and wit-
nesses, bribery in sporting contests, unlawful use of explosives, transmission of wagering informa-
tion, escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751, influencing or injuring an officer, juror, or witness generally,
obstruction of criminal investigations, obstruction of state or local law enforcement, Presidential
assassinations, kidnapping, and assault, interference with commerce by threats or violence, interstate
and foreign travel or transportation in aid or racketeering enterprises, use of interstate commerce
facilities in the commission of murder for hire, violent crimes in the aid or racketeering activity,
offer, acceptance, or solicitation to influence operations of employee benefit plans, prohibition of
business enterprises of gambling, laundering of monetary instruments, engaging in monetary trans-
actions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, theft from interstate shipment, embez-
zlement from pension and welfare funds, fraud by wire, radio, or television, sexual exploitation of
children, interstate transportation of stolen property, trafficking in certain motor vehicles or parts,
hostage taking, fraud and related activity in connection with access devices, failure to appear, witness
relocation and assistance, destruction of aircraft or facilities, racketeer influenced and corrupt orga-
nizations, threatening or retaliating against a federal official, destruction of an energy facility, mail
fraud, congressional, Cabinet, or Supreme Court assassinations, kidnapping and assault, transac-
tions involving nuclear materials, destruction of motor vehicles or motor vehicle facilities, or wreck-
ing trains. Section 2516(1)(d) authorizes orders in the case of counterfeiting offenses, while
§ 2516(l)(e) pertains to fraud in a Title 11 case or manufacture, importation, receiving, conceal-
ment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana, or other dangerous drugs.
Sections 2516(1)(f), (g), (h), (i), (j), and (k) address offenses involving extortionate credit transac-
tions, reporting of currency transactions, interception devices and interception and disclosure of
certain communications, destruction of natural gas pipelines or aircraft piracy, the Arms Export
Control Act, and location of fugitives from justice, respectively.
Under § 2516(2) state law enforcement officers may obtain surveillance orders under state law
to investigate and acquire:
evidence of the commission of the offense of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, ex-
tortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous drugs, or other crime
dangerous to life, limb or property, and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year, designated in any applicable State statute authorizing interception, or any conspiracy
to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1988). State statutes, therefore, can authorize the use of electronic surveillance
to investigate only those crimes that fall within the framework of § 2516.
78 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a) (1988); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 579-80 (1974) (holding
that failure to satisfy the identification requirement does not require suppression of the evidence if
the application was in fact properly authorized).
79 18 U.S.C. § 2518()(b) (1988).
80 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(i)-(iv) (1988). See also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 4.4, at 232-33.
In regard to identity of the subject of the interception, in United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974),
the Court held admissible evidence obtained pursuant to a court order authorizing interception of
conversations "of Irving Kahn and others as yet unknown." Id. at 147. The Court held "that Title
III requires the naming of a person in the application or interception order only when the law en-
[Vol. 65:490
the four elements required by section 2518(1)(b) must be shown by
proof sufficient to support ajudicial finding of probable cause that those
facts exist. If the applicant offers insufficient facts to establish probable
cause concerning any of the four elements, the order cannot be issued.
The judge determines probable cause to support issuance of a surveil-
lance order using the same standards and procedures as those used in
conventional search warrant cases.81
Under section 2518(1)(c), "a full and complete statement as to
whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed
or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be
too dangerous must be included in the application." The purpose of this
provision is to ensure that electronic surveillance is not "routinely em-
ployed as the initial step in criminal investigation"8 2 or "resorted to in
situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to ex-
pose the crime." 83
Under section 2518(1)(d), the application must also state the period
of time surveillance will be necessary. If the investigators wish to con-
tinue surveillance beyond the first interception of the type of conversa-
tion sought, section 2518(1)(d) requires the application to establish
probable cause to believe additional communications of the same type
will occur.
Finally, surveillance order applications must contain a statement
concerning previous related applications. Section 2518(1) (e) requires
that the application contain:
a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous ap-
plications known to the individual authorizing and making the applica-
tion, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval
of interceptions of, wire, oral or electronic communications involving
any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the applica-
tion, and the action taken by the judge on each such application.8 4
forcement authorities have probable cause to believe that the individual is 'committing the offense
for which the wiretap is sought.'" lId at 155. The Court also noted that nothing in Title III sup-
ports "an additional requirement that the Government investigate all persons who may be using the
subject telephone in order to determine their possible complicity." Id at 153 n.12. In United States
v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413,435-37 (1977), the Court held that evidence obtained pursuant to a court
order violating the particularity requirement of § 2518(1)(b)(iv) need not be suppressed because the
"naming" requirement does not play a "substantial role" in the regulatory scheme, in that even with
the omissions "the application provided sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to deter-
mine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied."
81 Under § 2518(I)(b), the judge must find probability, and not a mere prima facie showing.
Appellate court review of such orders is not de novo, United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 864
(Ist Cir. 1984) (en banc), but "the reviewing court determines simply whether the facts are mini-
mally adequate to support the findings made by the issuingjudge." CARR, supra note 6, § 4.4(c), at
4-28 to 4-30 (footnotes omitted).
82 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974).
83 United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974). See also Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S.
238, 250 (1979) (The restrictions of § 2528(l)(c) are intended to guarantee that electronic surveil-
lance is resorted to "only when there is a genuine need for it."). A reviewing court makes a de novo
or independent review of whether the application contained a "full and complete statement" con-
cerning the success or feasibility of alternative investigative procedures. United States v. Davis, 882
F.2d 1334, 1335 (8th Cir. 1989) ("de novo"); United States v. Carneiro, 861 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("independent").
84 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(e) (1988).
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This provision prevents 'judge shopping" and provides the judge with
an additional factor upon which he may assess the statements of probable
cause and investigative necessity.8 5 Since it is central to the statutory
scheme, deliberate omission of the previous application's information re-
quires suppression of any evidence obtained under the order.8 6
Before the reviewing judge can issue a Title III surveillance order,
he must find, based on the facts presented in the application, that:
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated
in section 2516 of this chapter;
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained by such interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or
the place where the wire, oral or electronic communications are to be
intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with
the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of,
or commonly used by such person.8 7
As long as the government's evidence shows that the issuing judge at
least read the application, defense challenges to the adequacy of the re-
view are generally rejected.88
c. The Issued Order
Section 2518(4) of Title III details the requirements for the contents
of the issued surveillance order. It requires that each order authorizing
85 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 4.4(b), at 234.
86 Id. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. Cf United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d
1492, 1500 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986). However, section 2518(I)(e) only requires
disclosure of what is known by those authorizing and making the application. Furthermore, it does
not apply to prior interceptions of the same person under an application in which that person was
not named or required to be named. d.
87 18 U.S.C. 2518(3) (1988). Title III's legislative history indicates that Congress intended the
probable cause determination to be governed by then existing constitutional standards. S. REP.
1097, supra note 6, at 2189. At the time Title III was enacted the constitutional standards for deter-
mining probable cause were embodied in the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964) (explained in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413,416 (1969)). It is, therefore, argua-
ble that Title III requires the judge to apply the two-pronged test ofAguilar and Spinelli, in determin-
ing probable cause for issuing a surveillance order. Nonetheless, a number of circuits have held that
the Title III probable cause determination is governed by the now current constitutional standard,
the "totality of the circumstances" test, under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See, e.g., United
States v. Gonzales, 866 F.2d 781, 786 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 L. Ed.2d 994, 109 S. Ct.
2438 (1989); United States v. Gallo, 863 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 L.
Ed.2d 843, 109 S. Ct. 1439 (1989); United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 478 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 263 (1989); United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1076 (8th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1332 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith,
726 F.2d 852, 864 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 841 (1984); United States v. Camp, 723 F.2d 741,
745-46 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 904 (1984).
88 CARR, supra note 6, § 4.6, at 4-88 (citing United States v. Feola, 651 F. Supp. 1068, 1108
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Lucido, 373 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (E.D. Mich. 1974); United States
v. Cantor, 328 F. Supp. 561, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
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or approving the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion must specify:
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are
to be intercepted;8 9
(b) the nature and location of the communication facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;90
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;9 1
(d) the order must also identify the agency authorized to intercept
the conversations and the person authorizing the application.92
Besides these particularity requirements, Title III requires that sur-
veillance orders contain certain directives designed to limit the scope of
the order. Under section 2518(4) (e), for example, the order must specify
"the period of time during which the interception is authorized, includ-
ing a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically
terminate when the described communication has been first obtained."
Section 2518(5) requires that the order contain a directive that it be "ex-
ecuted as soon as practicable. ' 9 3 Section 2518(5) also provides that au-
thorization may not last "for any period longer than is necessary to
achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than
thirty days."' 94 Section 2518(6) provides that it is within the court's dis-
cretion to "require reports to be made to the judge who issued the order
showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the au-
thorized objective and the need for continued interception." 95
89 The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not require identification of persons
subject to interception and that suppression is not required for failure to name known individuals.
See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427 (1977); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 152-53
(1974).
90 This exception does not apply when roving surveillance has been approved under § 2518(11).
Suppression is not required when the order's description of the facilities or location of the sur-
veillance is faulty, providing other information particularly describes. the facilities or location and no
danger exists that the misidentification will result in a misdirected electronic search. See United
States v. Doolittle, 507 F.2d 1368, aft'd en banc, 518 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
905 (1977); United States v. Bynum, 386 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aft'd, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975).
91 This provision attempts to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a search warrant de-
scribe with particularity the "things to be seized." U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
92 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(d) (1988). The requirement of identification of the person authorizing
the application "looks backwards to the official who approved the application under § 2516(1) or
§ 2516(2), 'so that responsibility will be fixed.'" CARR, supra note 6, § 4.7(d) (citing S. REP. No.
1097, supra note 6, at 2192).
93 This provision prevents the probable cause information from becoming stale or inaccurate
and was a mandate of Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967).
94 One commentator remarks that despite the apparent thirty-day maximum, in reality surveil-
lance orders may be extended indefinitely as a result of the opportunity to obtain an unlimited
number of extension orders. He argues that the opportunity for unlimited extensions and the ambi-
guity of § 2518(5)'s phrase "objective of the authorization," delegate unlimited discretion to execut-
ing officers with respect to length of the search. CARR, supra note 6, § 4.7(3)(1)(C), at 4-106, 107.
Courts have held, however, that the requirements of § 2518(5) adequately limit officer discretion.
See United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 886 (1973); United
States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 497 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974). See also CARR,
supra note 6, § 2.5(c)(3), at 2-29.
95 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1988).
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In addition to these temporal limitations, section 2518(5) also re-
quires that the surveillance order mandate that surveillance "shall be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communica-
tions not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter." 96
3. Execution Provisions
Title III's provisions pertaining to execution of the surveillance or-
der impose even more significant privacy safeguards than those con-
tained in its authorization provisions. Compliance with these provisions
is essential to the admissibility of plain view evidence derived by elec-
tronic surveillance. As with the authorization provisions, Title III sets
the minimum standards and serves as a model for state statutes. The
recording requirement, the minimization requirement, the termination
requirements and the requirements for amending a surveillance order
are most relevant to the admissibility of plain view interceptions. The
recording, minimization and termination requirements set standards lim-
iting the scope of surveillance under the original surveillance order. The
amendment provisions premise the admissibility of plain view intercep-
tions upon compliance with these other execution provisions because,
together, they define "a valid initial intrusion." 97
a. The Recording Requirement
Title III's section 2518(8) (a) requires that any intercepted communi-
cation "shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other compara-
ble device ... in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or
other alterations." The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that an
accurate record of the conversation is made in the first instance and not
altered in the interim before its use.98 "This means that monitoring
agents should record everything which is overheard by them, whether or
not it is deemed pertinent." 99 Recording all monitored conversations
pursuant to section 2518(8) (a) is necessary for an effective review of min-
imization efforts. However, the recording requirement should be distin-
guished from the minimization required by Berger v. New York 100 and
section 2518(5).101
b. The Minimization Requirement
In Berger, the Supreme Court held that a New York eavesdropping
statute was unconstitutional because it allowed the seizure of "the con-
versations of any and all persons coming into the area covered by the
[eavesdropping] device . . . indiscriminately and without regard to their
connection to the crime under investigation."'' 0 2 The Court held that the
statute permitted what amounted to a general search prohibited by the
96 For further discussion of minimization, see infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
98 S. REP. 1097, supra note 6, at 2193.
99 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, at 236.
100 388 U.S. 41 (1967)
101 See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
102 Berger v. New York, 338 U.S. at 59.
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fourth amendment and that evidence gathered pursuant to the unconsti-
tutional statute must be excluded. In order to conform to the constitu-
tional mandates of Berger, section 2518(5) requires that an electronic
surveillance order be executed "in such a way as to minimize the inter-
ception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under
this chapter." Tide III does not specify any particular procedures that
must be employed to accomplish minimization, nor does the statute pro-
vide any criteria by which to measure the sufficiency of minimization ef-
forts. Case law has filled these statutory gaps.
In Scott v. United States,10 3 government agents, pursuant to a validly
issued surveillance order, intercepted nearly every conversation over a
particular telephone line. The government agents suspected that the
subject of the surveillance was using the telephone line to further a con-
spiracy to import and distribute narcotics. The evidence showed that
only forty percent of the conversations intercepted in the one-month pe-
riod were related to the crime under investigation. The Supreme Court
held that, in this case, the investigators did not violate section 2518(5)'s
minimization requirements and that section 2518(5) does not prohibit
the interception of all nonpertinent communications but rather requires
that all agents conduct the surveillance so as to keep interception of such
communications to a minimum. The Court held that sufficiency of mini-
mization efforts depends upon "an objective assessment of the officer's
actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the
time."10 4 The Court considered several factors in deciding whether sec-
tion 2518(5)'s minimization requirement was met. These factors
included:
(1) percentage of nonpertinent communications intercepted; (2) the
nature of the offense under investigation and the purpose of the sur-
veillance; (3) the normal use of the communications equipment sub-
ject to the interception; and (4) the stage of the authorized period of
surveillance in which the interceptions in question took place.105
The more controversial holding of the Scott case is that courts should
assess minimization efforts based on an objective standard. The Court
held that the fact that the agents made no attempt to comply with section
2518(5)'s minimization requirements did not, by itself, require suppres-
sion. 106 The Court stated that "subjective intent alone.., does not make
otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." 10 7 This aspect of
the Scott decision received much criticism. 108 Under Scott's objective
standard, establishing sufficient minimization efforts is not difficult if the
executing officers are well informed. For example, evidence of good
103 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
104 Ia at 135.
105 Id at 140-41.
106 Ia at 137-39.
107 Id at 136.
108 See Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 108-12; FISHMAN, supra note 6, at 226-32 (1978); CARR, supra
note 6, § 5.7(d), at 5-39 & 5-40. While Scott does not require a good faith effort at minimization,
good faith should be considered as a factor in evaluating minimization efforts. See Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. at 149.
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faith spot-monitoring of nonpertinent conversations will usually meet
Scott 's objective test.
Today, minimization is probably most crucial in the context of
"plain view" interceptions. 09 Before the court can grant retroactive ju-
dicial approval for the interception of incriminating conversations unre-
lated to the crimes designated in the order, the judge must be convinced
that such communications were "intercepted in accordance with the pro-
visions of [Title III]."iO Noncompliance with section 2518(5)'s minimi-
zation requirement is probably the best argument in support of a motion
to suppress plain view evidence generated by electronic surveillance.
c. Requirements for Terminating The Surveillance Order
Specific provisions that regulate the duration of surveillance place
further restrictions on electronic searches. Under section 2518(4) (e), the
surveillance order must specify "the period of time during which . . .
interception is authorized." The period is limited to the time "necessary
to achieve the objective of the authorization," but cannot be longer than
thirty days. Therefore, surveillance must terminate on the date specified
in the order and may not extend any longer than necessary for the sur-
veillance to accomplish its original purpose."'
d. Requirements for Amending The Surveillance Order
The controversy surrounding the admissibility of plain view inter-
ceptions stems from Title III's amendment provision. Section 2517(5)
provides procedures for amending a surveillance order so as to retroac-
tively authorize interception of communications concerning crimes not
described in the original order. If officers are conducting surveillance
pursuant to a Title III order and intercept communications relating to a
crime other than the crimes specified in the order, the officers may,
under section 2517(5), disclose the contents of the communications to
other law enforcement or investigative officers to the extent "appropriate
to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or
receiving disclosure."' 12 Section 2517(5) also permits the intercepting
109 See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
110 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1988).
111 In determining whether surveillance officers satisfied Title III's requirement to terminate
upon attainment of the authorized objective, courts apply a reasonableness standard. See generally
Cromwell, Judicial Fine-tuning of Electronic Surveillance, 6 SEroN HALL 225, 249 (1975).
112 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (1988). Section 2517 reads as follows:
§ 2517. Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire, oral, and electronic com-
munications.
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this
chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to another investigative
officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the
official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this
chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion or evidence derived therefrom may use such contents to the extent such use is appro-
priate to the proper performance of his official duties.
(3) Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any infor-
mation concerning a wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived there-
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officer to "use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to the
proper performance of his official duties."'1 13 Furthermore, the contents
of communications concerning other crimes, and any evidence derived
therefrom, are admissible in judicial proceedings, but only if "a judge of
competent jurisdiction... finds on subsequent application that the con-
tents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter. Such application shall be made as soon as practicable."'1 14
An amendment under section 2517(5) constitutes retroactive judicial
approval of the interception of communications relating to crimes not
described in the original order. The application for such an amendment
should "include a showing that the original order was lawfully obtained,
that it was sought in good faith and not as a subterfuge search, and that
the communication was in fact incidentally intercepted during the course
of a lawfully executed order." 11 5  Section 2517(5) has been held consti-
tutionally valid based on the plain view doctrine." 6
4. Suppression Provisions
Like any other search, if an instance of electronic surveillance does
not measure up to fourth amendment standards, a judicially created ex-
from in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may disclose the contents of that
communication or such derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirma-
tion in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of any State or
political subdivision thereof.
1 (4) No otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in
accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged
character.
(5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire, oral, or
electronic communication in the manner authorized herein, intercepts wire, oral or electronic communica-
tions relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents
thereof and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of
this section. Such contents and any evidence derived therefrom may be used under subsection (3) of this
section when authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subse-
quent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter. Such application shall be made as soon as practicable.
18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1988) (emphasis added).
113 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (1988).
114 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1988).
115 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2189. See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the requirement of "incidental" interception.
116 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 825 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Sklar-
off, 323 F. 'Supp. 296, 307 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874
(1975); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295,300-01 (S.D. Fla. 1970); People v. DiStefano, 38
N.Y.2d 640, 345 N.E.2d 548, 552, 382 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9 (1976).
There may also be occasions when prospective amendment of a surveillance order becomes neces-
sary. For example, assume the surveillance order designates gambling as the subject offense but the
officers begin to intercept conversations concerning narcotics. As soon as practicable the officers
should apply for § 2517(5) retroactive judicial approval to intercept these narcotics conversations in
plain view. Nonetheless, a point in time will come when the interception of narcotics conversations
is occurring with such frequency that it is no longer "inadvertent" or "incidental," as (arguably)
required for admissibility under § 2517(5) and the plain view doctrine. See supra notes 30, 115 and
accompanying text. Cf supra note 31 and infra notes 140, 220-25 and accompanying text. By this
point, the investigators must have prospectively amended the surveillance order so that they would
be authorized to intercept further conversations relating to narcotics offenses. To obtain a prospec-
tive amendment, the applicants must satisfy the probable cause requirements of § 2518. See supra
text accompanying notes 79-81, 87.
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clusionary rule' 17 will exclude any evidence obtained during the surveil-
lance. Additionally, two provisions in Title III establish statutory bases
for exclusion. Section 2515 provides that
[w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding before any court grand jury, department,.... if the disclo-
sure of that information would be in violation of this chapter."18
Section 2518(10) (a) provides the procedural bases for implementing sec-
tion 2515. Under section 2518(10)(a), a suppression motion can rest on
any of three grounds: "(i) the communication was unlawfully inter-
cepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was
intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the interception was not
made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval." 119
In United States v. Giordano,120 the Supreme Court interpreted the
provisions of section 2518(10)(a). The Court held that "[t]he words 'un-
lawfully intercepted' are themselves not limited to constitutional viola-
tions.' 2' Rather, section 2518(10)(a)(i) was "intended to require
suppression where there is failure to satisfy any of those statutory re-
quirements that . . . was intended to play a central role in the statutory
scheme."' 22 The Court interpreted the second and third subsections of
section 2518(10)(a) as supplemental to the broad meaning of section
2518(10)(a)(i). Subsections (ii) and (iii) provide "suppression for failure
to observe some statutory requirements that would not render intercep-
tions unlawful under paragraph (i). '"123 In United States v. Chavez,12 4 the
Supreme Court addressed the "insufficient on its face" test of subpara-
graph (ii). The Court concluded that the test requires suppression only
when the order is determined to be insufficient without resort to any
other facts.
Title III grants standing for a motion to suppress under section
2518(10)(a) to any "aggrieved person." Section 2510(11) defines an ag-
grieved person as one "who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral or
electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was
directed." Title III's legislative history indicates that the drafters in-
tended section 2510(11) to reflect existing law with respect to standing
to exclude evidence obtained through eavesdropping.12 5 Therefore, Ti-
tle III incorporates the Supreme Court's decision in Alderman v. United
117 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See supra text accompanying note 102.
118 Commentators suggest that the language of section 2515, properly read, requires exclusion of
evidence when the seizure of such evidence violated Title III. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40,
§ 4.6(a), at 240.
119 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1988).
120 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
121 Id. at 527.
122 Id. at 527-28. Provisions that "play a central role in the statutory scheme," are those provi-
sions "that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of inter-
cept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary
investigative device." Id. at 527.
123 Id.
124 416 U.S. 562 (1977).
125 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2180.
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States 126 which expands standing under section 2510(11) to include per-
sons with a possessory interest in the location subject to the
surveillance. 127
B. Title III and the Plain View Doctrine
Section 2517(5) provides that when officers are executing a surveil-
lance order and they intercept a conversation relating to a crime not de-
scribed in their order, the conversation is inadmissible as evidence in a
judicial proceeding unless the officers obtain a retroactive amendment to
the original order.128 According to the plain view doctrine, however, of-
ficers need not amend a conventional search warrant to ensure the ad-
missibility of plain view evidence seized during a conventional search.
Thus, section 2517(5)'s retroactive amendment provision exceeds fourth
amendment requirements. This condition exists not as a result of legisla-
tive design but because fourth amendment standards for the admissibility
of plain view evidence evolved after Title III was enacted.
1. Legislative History
When Title III was drafted in 1968, Marron v. United States 129 still
restricted seizures to items described with particularity in the warrant.
The Supreme Court had recognized the legality of plain view seizures
made pursuant to lawful warrantless searches.' 30 But the Court had not
yet issued its opinions in Coolidge v. New Hampshire13 and Texas v.
Brown,13 2 which permitted plain view seizures made while executing a
warrant. To ensure compliance with then current fourth amendment ju-
risprudence, Title III's drafters included section 2517(5)'s retroactive
amendment requirement. 133
126 394 U.S. 165 (1965).
127 In addition to the suppression sanction, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1988) allows for civil remedies for
violations of Title III and 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988) allows for criminal penalties for violations of the
statute. See CARR, supra note 6, § 8.2, at 8-6 and § 8.3, at 8-16.1.
128 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
129 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); see supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 24, 25 and accompanying text.
131 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); see supra notes 26-32 and accompanying
text.
132 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1982); see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
133 See Blakey & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
657, 670-71 (1968). Professor Blakey was the principal drafter of Title III. While Congress was
debating over the bills that would later become Title III, the NOTRE DAME LAWYER published Profes-
sors Blakey and Hancock's proposed electronic surveillance statute. To deal with plain view inter-
ceptions, the proposed statute included section 7(b)(1) which read as follows:
(b) The [insert appropriate prosecuting officer] may authorize, in writing, any investi-
gative or law enforcement officer to make application to a court of competent jurisdiction
for an order of approval of the previous interception of any wire or oral communication
when the contents:
(1) relate to an offense other than that specified in an order of authorization ....
Id at 670. In the footnote that followed this section, the authors explained that: "[p]aragraph (1)
sets up a procedure modeled on the present search warrant procedure under which use and disclo-
sure might be based upon a subsequent court order.... Such a procedure represents the 'safe way'
to handle [the problem posed by Matron's interpretation of the fourth amendment's particularity
requirement]." Id. at 670-71 n.27.
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Congress intended the amendment process under section 2517(5) to
be analogous to what was, in 1968, accepted practice by officers who dis-
covered evidence in plain view while executing a search warrant which
did not particularly describe the item viewed. The officers could lawfully
seize the evidence if they posted a guard for the item while another of-
ficer obtained a second search warrant authorizing seizure of the plain
view evidence. Title III's drafters reasoned that conversations concern-
ing crimes not described in the electronic surveillance order could be
intercepted and admitted in evidence if authorized by subsequent
amendment to the original surveillance order. 3 4 This analogy was open
to criticism because conversations in plain view are necessarily "seized"
before the subsequent authorization can be obtained, while conventional
plain view evidence is not "seized" until after a second warrant is issued
(even though the guarding officer ensured the plain view evidence re-
mained undisturbed). The drafters considered this distinction inconse-
quential. They reasoned that admissibility under section 2517(5) is
conditional upon a prompt judicial determination that the plain view in-
terception conforms with the provisions of Title 111.135
Today, "the establishment of the plain view doctrine and the appar-
ent rejection of Marron have made the theory behind section 2517(5) ob-
solete."' 36 Consequently, legislators have attempted to eliminate or
relax Title III's amendment requirement. 37 These attempts have been
unsuccessful. Thus, section 2517(5) remains as originally enacted, and
plain view evidence derived by electronic surveillance is admissible in
court only if the following requirements are met. First, an application to
amend the surveillance order must be made "as soon as practicable"'' 38
to ajudge of competent jurisdiction (as defined in section 2510(9)). Sec-
ond, the judge must approve or authorize the disclosure of the contents
134 See Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 141-42.
135 Id. at 142.
136 G. Robert Blakey, Lecture on the Execution of Electronic Surveillance, Federal Criminal Law
Class, University of Notre Dame Law School (April 19, 1989). See also Goldsmith, supra note 6, at
143. Professor Goldsmith states: "[W]hen the Supreme Court later gave plain view seizures broad
fourth amendment approval in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, it became apparent that a formal retroactive
amendment, as required by section 2517(5), was not constitutionally necessary." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
137 See Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 145, 155-56 (citing A Bill to Amend Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act of 1968: Hearings on S. 1717 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988) (statement of Clifford Fishman, Associate Professor of Law,
Catholic University of America) and S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3105(a) (1982) (proposing to
eliminate the amendment requirement or to postpone the amendment requirement until the plain
view communication is offered into evidence)).
138 With respect to the prompt application requirement, commentators have noted that "delays
of several months have often been tolerated" and that "present practice [in applying for retroactive
amendments] is so loose that the statutory language is actually being disregarded." Goldsmith, supra
note 6, at 144 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., United States v. De Palma, 461 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), where the court ruled that the plain view interceptions were admissible even though the
investigators did not apply for § 2517(5) amendment until six months after terminating surveillance
under the original order. The court stated:
[Section 2517(5)] does not contemplate immediate amendment of orders of authorization
as soon as information relating to other offenses is intercepted. To maintain so is to ignore
the existence of Section 2517(1) and (2) which explicitly allow the use of such information
without an amendment to the order of authorization.
Id. at 825.
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of the intercepted communication, or evidence derived from it, upon a
finding that the contents were intercepted in accordance with the provi-
sions of Title 111.139
Title III's legislative history explains that the second requirement
mandates a showing that "the original order was lawfully obtained, that it
was sought in good faith and not as a subterfuge search, and that the
communication was in fact incidentally intercepted during the course of a
lawfully executed order."'140 The legislative history also states that the
plain view communication need not relate to an offense designated by
section 2516(1) as a proper subject of a Title III surveillance order.141
2. Judicial Construction
An increasing number of courts liberally construe section 2517(5)'s
requirements which more freely admits plain view interceptions as evi-
dence in a grand jury or judicial proceeding. But a minority of courts
continue to strictly apply the requirements of section 2517(5). For exam-
ple, in United States v. Brodson,142 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin denied the government's motion to recon-
sider the court's previous dismissal of an indictment. The indictment
charged a violation of a federal statute prohibiting transmission of wa-
gering information.1 43 The government intercepted evidence of that of-
fense while executing a surveillance order that authorized interception of
communications relating to the operation of illegal gambling businesses,
which was a violation of a different federal statute.1 44 The government
applied for a section 2517(5) amendment one week before the date of
trial but well after it had presented the evidence to the grand jury and
secured an indictment. The court denied the government's application
for retroactive amendment and dismissed the indictment issued against
the defendant because the government failed to comply with section
2517(5). The court interpreted the provision to mandate the application
for an amendment before the plain view interceptions could be disclosed
to a grand jury. The court reasoned:
The language of [section] 2517 is straightforward. It is designed
to avoid electronic fishing expeditions and other abuses by requiring
the prosecution to come forward with evidence of offenses other than
139 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1988).
140 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2189. Some commentators suggest that § 2517(5) may be
unconstitutional because "incidental interception" is a less stringent standard than Coolidge's "inad-
vertent discovery" requirement. See, e.g., CARR, supra note 6, § 5.9(b), at 5-59 & 5-60. Since the
Court itself has questioned the necessity of "inadvertent discovery" (seesupra note 31), § 2517(5) will
likely withstand constitutional challenge. Moreover, courts that have interpreted the "incidentally
intercepted" language of § 2517(5)'s legislative history hold that the language does not embody
Coolidge's inadvertent discovery requirement. See infra notes 200-25 and accompanying text.
141 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2189. See also, In Re Grand Jury Subpoena served on Doe,
889 F.2d 384, 387 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that § 2517(5) amendments may retroactively approve
interception and disclosure of communications relating to both federal and state offenses not listed
in § 2516, absent indication of bad faith or subterfuge by investigators applying for the § 2517(5)
amendment).
142 393 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1975).
143 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1988).
144 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988).
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those specified by the court in the original electronic surveillance au-
thorization-but obtained pursuant thereto-as soon as practicable
... prior to its use in any [proceeding held under the authority of the
United States].... Only through strict adherence to the requirements
of [section] 2517(5) can the court's supervisory role in this sensitive
area remain effective. 145
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc, the government ar-
gued that a 2517(5) amendment was unnecessary because the inter-
cepted conversations "related to" the federal gambling offense specified
in the original order as well as the gambling offense for which the de-
fendant was indicted.1 46 Writing for a unanimous panel, retired
Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark upheld the district court's ruling.
Justice Clark opined that without the strict adherence to section 2517(5)
insisted upon by the district court, Title III surveillance orders were in
danger of degenerating into "the electronic equivalent ... of a 'general
search warrant.' ,,147 The court, therefore, rejected the government's ar-
gument and held that while there may be some overlap of evidence re-
quired to prove the two gambling offenses, the offenses involve
dissimilar elements and are "wholly separate and distinct."1 48 However,
Justice Clark stressed that the court's holding was based not on the dis-
similarity of the offenses but on "the fact that the Government itself has
violated the key provision of the legislative scheme of 2515 [protecting
individual privacy], in that it did not comply with the mandate of Section
2517(5). ' ' 149
In United States v. Marion, 150 the Second Circuit cited Brodson to sup-
port its decision to reverse the defendant's convictions for perjury and
obstruction ofjustice. In his first appearance before a federal grand jury,
the defendant, Marion testified under grant of immunity. The govern-
ment questioned him based on two conversations intercepted while exe-
cuting two surveillance orders issued by a justice of the New York State
Supreme Court. One of the orders, the "Delmonico Order," authorized
interception of conversations relating to the state offense of possession
of dangerous weapons. While executing the Delmonico Order, investi-
gators intercepted a conversation relating to possible violations of a fed-
eral law prohibiting the transportation and transfer of an unregistered
weapon in interstate commerce,' 5 ' a crime not specified in the state sur-
veillance order. On the basis of inconsistencies between these conversa-
tions and Marion's testimony before the first grand jury, a second grand
jury indicted Marion for perjury and obstruction ofjustice. In the second
grand jury proceeding, the government disclosed the conversation about
the federal offense intercepted pursuant to the Delmonico Order, but
without first applying for and receiving retroactive amendment to the
145 United States v. Brodson, 393 F. Supp. at 624 (emphasis in original).
146 United States v. Brodson, 528 F.2d at 215.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 216.
149 Id.
150 535 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1976).
151 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922 (1988).
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original order.152 Marion made a pretrial motion to dismiss the indict-
ment on the ground that, by disclosing evidence of the federal offense to
the grand jury, the government violated section 2517(5). The trial judge
denied the motion and Marion was eventually convicted. The Second
Circuit reversed. The court refused to accept the dissent's conclusion
that the state and federal offenses at issue were "closely enough related
to consider them as the same for the purpose of [section] 2517(5)."' 15
Rather, the court held:
It is clear beyond all doubt that this federal offense was separate
and distinct from the alleged state crime which formed the predicate "
for the original Delmonico wiretap authorization, and thus falls within
the ambit of [section] 2517(5) .... Because the conversations here in
question clearly did relate to offenses "other than those specified" in
the state court's ... order of authorization, and since the Government
failed to obtain subsequent judicial approval required by [section]
2517(5) ... Marion's conviction.., must be reversed."1 54
More recently, Judge Getzendanner, in United States v. Mancari,155
followed the literal approach of Brodson and Marion despite "aspersions
cast on these case[s] by other circuits" purporting to establish more pref-
erable, "flexible" interpretations of section 2517(5)'s requirements.156
In Mancari, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) installed a wiretap
on the defendant's telephone. The surveillance order authorized the FBI
to intercept the defendant's phone conversations relating to offenses of
interstate transportation and receipt of stolen property, participation in
an "enterprise involving a pattern of racketeering activity" (a RICO vio-
lation)1 57 and conspiracy to commit those offenses. The investigation
into these offenses stemmed from the defendant's alleged involvement in
a widespread scheme to sell automobiles rebuilt from stolen auto bodies
and other parts. After thirty days of surveillance under the original order
the FBI applied for an extension. The application mentioned, in addi-
tion to the original offenses, the suspicion that the defendant was in-
volved in distribution of controlled substances. The judge approved the
extension. More than three years later, a special grand jury indicted the
defendant, charging various acts of mail and wire fraud stemming from
auto theft, insurance-fraud-related-activities and distribution of cocaine.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment or alterna-
tively to suppress the wiretap evidence of mail and wire fraud on the
ground that the government failed to obtain a section 2517(5) amend-
152 Despite the fact that investigators intercepted the evidence pursuant to state authorization,
the court held that in the federal proceeding § 2517(5) governed admissibility rather than a similar
New York provision because the New York provision was potentially less exacting than § 2517(5):
"whether the proceeding be federal or state, interpretation of a state wiretap statute can never be
controlling where it might impose requirements less stringent than the controlling standard of Title
III." United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d at 702 (footnotes omitted). See also infra note 234.
153 Id. at 709 (Anderson, J., dissenting in pertinent part).
154 Id. at 704 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
155 663 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
156 Id. at 1353.
157 Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)).
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ment. In its brief, the government claimed that a proper application and
order was filed and signed. Nevertheless, the documents submitted
along with the government's brief indicated that application and ap-
proval of retroactive amendment of the original order did not occur until
the day that the grand jury handed down the indictments. Predictably,
the defendant argued that any prior use of the intercepted communica-
tions pertaining to mail and wire fraud and before the grand jury tainted
the indictments and mandated their dismissal. Judge Getsendanner
wrote:
Given [the chronology of events in this case] and the rule articu-
lated in Brodson, I conclude that any disclosure of intercepted conver-
sations pertaining to mail or wire fraud (or any information derived
from such interceptions) to the grand jury prior to the date of the [ret-
roactive amendment to the original order] violates Tide III.
In light of the foregoing, the government is ordered to immedi-
ately advise the court whether it did, in fact, make such disclosures
before the grand jury. Should this be the case, the parties will be or-
dered to brief the question of appropriate relief.'58
In reaching this decision, Judge Getzendanner adopted "Brodson's
clear cut approach"' 59 to section 2517(5). She characterized section
2517(5) as imposing a "post-intercept/pre-disclosure requirement [that]
is not a mere technicality whose violation is easily cured; it is a 'key provi-
sion of the legislative scheme . .'.".,160 Her opinion expressly rejected
more flexible interpretations of the section 251 7 (5)'s requirements which
she recognized as being accepted by a growing number of United States
Courts of Appeals:
In recent years, courts have attempted to evade the harsh results
compelled by Brodson through more "flexible" interpretations of the
statute's requirement.... [Tihese "flexible rules seem far less prefer-
able than Brodson's clear-cut approach. Accordingly, I believe that
Brodson remains both rationally compelling and legally in force, de-
spite aspersions cast on the case by other circuits.'61
Judge Getzendanner's rationale for rejecting more flexible interpre-
tations of section 2517(5) rested, in part, on the premise that the stat-
ute's drafters intended the retroactive amendment requirement to
function primarily as an extra safeguard furthering Title III's underlying
policy that statutory authority to conduct electronic surveillance be used
with restraint. She noted "the evident care with which Title III was
drafted to balance Congress's competing concerns,"' 162 and that
" '[o]ften, legislators, to make doubly sure, draft a statute that goes fur-
ther than the goal they wanted to achieve; they overshoot the mark to
make sure they won't undershoot it.' "163
158 United States v. Mancari, 663 F. Supp. at 1354.
159 Id. at 1353.
160 Id. at 1351 (quoting United States v. Brodson, 528 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1975)).
161 United States v. Mancari, 663 F. Supp. at 1351-53.
162 Id. at 1352.
163 Id. (quoting Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. O'Neil, 809 F.2d 351, 353 (7th Cir. 1987)).
[Vol. 65:490
As previously discussed,1 64 however, the primary motivation for sec-
tion 2517(5)'s retroactive amendment requirement was ensuring compli-
ance with then current fourth amendment law governing plain view
seizures and not to add to Title III's privacy safeguards. In 1968, fourth
amendment law governing plain view seizures was embodied in the
Supreme Court's decision in Manron v. United States.165 The drafters of
section 2517(5) interpreted Maron as requiring a procedure analogous
to, what was then, the prevailing practice of posting a guard over plain
view evidence discovered in a search pursuant to a warrant until another
officer could obtain a second warrant authorizing seizure of the item.1 66
Nonetheless, since the Court's decisions in Coolidge v. New Hampshire 167
and Texas v. Brown,' 68 effectively overruled Marron, the rationale behind
section 2517(5) is outdated. It is not surprising that an increasing
number of courts have reacted by liberally interpreting section 2517(5).
Courts have fashioned three exceptions or rules relaxing or obviat-
ing the requirements of section 2517(5) under certain circumstances.169
These exceptions or rules are: (1) "the similar offense exception;" (2)
"the integral part exception;" and (3) "the implicit authorization rule."
The first two exceptions are based on liberal interpretations of what con-
stitutes communications "relating to offenses other than those specified
in the order of authorization," the interception of which triggers section
2517(5)'s retroactive amendment requirement. The implicit authoriza-
tion rule is a liberal interpretation of what constitutes "subsequent appli-
cation" for a retroactive amendment and what constitutes sufficient
judicial authorization or approval to disclose the contents of plain view
interceptions.
The similar offense exception to section 2517(5)'s retroactive
amendment requirement was conceived by the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Campagnuolo 170 and explained by the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. Watchmaker. 171 The exception is founded on section 2517(5)'s
stated purpose, 172 of preventing subterfuge searches.' 7 3 By focusing on
the statute's purpose, the exception permits a more "flexible" interpreta-
tion of the statute. It allows courts to relax the authorization require-
ment, in cases where the offense specified in the original order and the
164 See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
165 275 U.S. 192 (1927). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
167 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
168 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
169 United States v. Mancari, 663 F. Supp. 1343, 1351-52 (N.D. Ii. 1987). See also United States v.
Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418, 1529 n.13 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
170 556 F.2d 1209, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1977).
171 761 F.2d 1459, 1470 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., Harrell v. United States, 474 U.S.
1100, (1986); see also United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 865-66 (lst Cir. 1984); United States v.
Arnold, 576 F. Supp. 304, 309 (N.D. Il. 1983); United States v. Young, 822 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir.
1987).
172 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
173 The Fifth Circuit elaborated on § 2517(5)'s legislative history stating that the purpose of
§ 2517(5) is to "assure that the Government does not secure a wiretap authorization order to investi-
gate one offense as a subterfuge to acquire evidence of a different offense for which the prerequisites
to an authorization order [e.g. probable cause] are lacking." United States v. Campagnuolo, 556
F.2d at 1214.
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offense for which information was disclosed were so similar in nature that
it would be unreasonable to believe the original application was a
subterfuge. 174
The second exception, the integral part exception, is closely related
to the similar offense exception, but was developed specifically for
RICO 175 cases. Like the similar offense exception, the integral part ex-
ception relaxes the requirements of section 2517(5) by liberally inter-
preting the provision in light of its purpose to prevent subterfuge
searches. Under this doctrine, interceptions made pursuant to a surveil-
lance order specifying a RICO predicate offense may be disclosed as evi-
dence of a RICO violation without obtaining a section 2517(5)
amendment even though the surveillance order did not mention RICO
itself.' 76 For example, in United States v. Watchmaker, 177 despite the gov-
ernment's failure to obtain a 2517(5) amendment, the court held that
interceptions made pursuant to an order specifying state narcotics of-
fenses were lawfully disclosed to a federal grand jury investigating RICO
violations.178 The court reasoned that:
[T]he prosecution under the RICO statute bears a unique kind of simi-
larity to the prosecution under the drug law. It is not merely a ques-
tion of crimes which have "some common elements" or "some
overlapping proof": where, as here, a drug offense is one of the predi-
cate acts for the RICO violation, every element of that offense must be
proven before the RICO violation can be established. Although the
object of the RICO statute might be different, the extent of similarity
in what must be proven makes "subterfuge" virtually impossible; the
government might seek, in the long run, to offer additional proof
against the "enterprise," but in the context of the intercepted conver-
sation, it is most likely that the government is interested in offering
evidence of the predicate offense. 179
Other cases suggest the possibility of an "inverse integral part" excep-
tion.180 This exception would permit the disclosure of interceptions re-
lating to predicate offenses made pursuant to an order authorizing
interceptions pertaining only to RICO violations without requiring a sec-
tion 2517(5) amendment as a prerequisite to such disclosure.
The third way courts have relaxed the requirements of section
2517(5) is by applying the "implied authorization rule." The Second
Circuit developed this rule in United States v. Tortorello, 18 and it has since
174 United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d at 1470. See also United States v. Mancari, 663 F.
Supp. 1343, 1352 (N.D. Ill. 1987); United States v. Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418, 1529 n.13 (S.D. Cal.
1986). Both cases discuss the similar offense exception but refuse to adopt it.
175 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
941-44 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)).
176 Id. at 1470-71 (discussed United States v. Mancari, 663 F. Supp. at 1342 and United States v.
Orozco, 630 F. Supp. at 1529 n.13).
177 761 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1985).
178 Id. at 1470-71. See also United States v. Mancari, 663 F. Supp. at 1352.
179 United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d at 1470-71.
180 United States v. Mancari, 663 F. Supp. at 1352 & n.18 (citing United States v. Sedovic, 679
F.2d 1233, 1235 & n.n.3, 4 (8th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1976)).
181 480 F.2d 764, 781-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) (discussed in United States v.
Mancari, 663 F. Supp. at 1351).
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been applied in other circuits18 2 The rule excuses a formal section
2517(5) application and amendment when plain view interceptions are
mentioned in an application for extension of the original order'83 or in a
judicial progress report'84 and the judge allows surveillance to continue.
The rationale behind the rule is that, by allowing surveillance to con-
tinue, the judge implicitly authorizes interception and disclosure of evi-
dence relating to the offenses mentioned in the extension application or
progress report. In other words:
"[Nothing in section 2517(5)] requires the issuing judge to an-
nounce formally in open court that he had noticed the interception of
evidence not covered by the original order and has determined that it
was properly obtained. It is enough if notification of the interception of evi-
dence not authorized by the original order be clearly provided in the renewal and
amendment application papers .... ." Thus, although a subsequent court
authorization or approval issued after express delineation of offenses
"other than those specified in the order" unquestionably satisfies [sec-
tion] 2517(5), it does not represent the only method of compliance.' 85
The implied authorization rule is subject to criticism because it is based
on the assumption that the judge will scrutinize the progress reports and
extension applications in the same manner he or she would review a sec-
tion 2517(5) application. One court has written that "it is not reasonable
to assume that a judge reviewing a request for an extension of a wiretap
order will search for evidence of crimes not specifically cited therein and
determine whether they meet the requirements of [Title III], without a
prosecution request to do so."86
In addition to these liberal constructions courts loosely interpret
section 2517(5)'s "as soon as practicable" language by tolerating delays
of several months. 187 Some courts even suggest that suppression is not
an available remedy for violations of section 2517(5).188 Thus, recogniz-
ing that section 2517(5)'s requirements unnecessarily exceed the current
182 See United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061
(1977); United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1503-04 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854
(1986); United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d 181, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Ardito, 782
F.2d 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, .476 U.S. 1160 (1986); United States v. Gambale, 610 F. Supp. 1515
(D.C. Mass. 1985).
183 Submitted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1988).
184 Submitted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1988).
185 United States v. Mascairelli, 558 F.2d at 1068 (quoting United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d
at 783) (emphasis in original)).
186 United States v. Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418, 1529 (S.D. Cal. 1986). See also Goldsmith, supra
note 6, at 144-45 ('Judges reviewing progress reports and applications-documents which are often
both lengthy and complex-will not necessarily perceive new crimes that have been intercepted.
Furthermore, a passing reference in a progress report or extension application does not provide an
appropriate context for formal determination of whether the interception complied with all plain
view requirements."); CARR, supra note 6, § 5.9(d)(1). at 5-68.1.
187 See Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 144 & n.857 and cases cited therein.
188 See id. at 145 (citing United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 855 (3d Cir. 1976)).
Decisions such as 'ento argue that § 2517(10)(a) (see supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text)
limits suppression to interception (or execution) violations. Therefore, suppression is an inappro-
priate remedy for a violation of § 2517(5)'s amendment requirements because late filing or failing to
file is a post-interception violation. United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d at 855. Professor Goldsmith
points out that:
This reading, however, ignores language in section 2518(5) which directly establishes an
evidentiary prerequisite to admissibility which is independent of Title III's exclusionary
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constitutional standards of the plain view doctrine, a majority of federal
courts liberally construe the statute's language to the point of ignoring it.
III. State Law Governing the Admissibility of Plain View Evidence
Derived Through Electronic Surveillance
A. State Electronic Surveillance Law Generally
Title III provides that states must enact specific legislation in order
to implement the authority granted by section 2516(2) to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance.18 9 At present, thirty-two states and the District of
Columbia have enacted statutes that legalize the use of electronic surveil-
lance. 190 Title III's legislative history indicates that it was not intended
rule; no evidence of other crimes [plain view interceptions] may be disclosed in judicial
proceedings unless timely retroactive amendment has been filed and approved.
Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 145.
Courts have taken three positions concerning the appropriate remedy when plain view intercep-
tions are disclosed to the grand jury in violation of § 2517(5)'s amendment requirements. See
United States v. Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418, 1529-30 (S.D. Cal. 1986). The first and most drastic
position holds that such a violation warrants dismissal of the entire indictment. Id (citing United
States v. Brodson, 528 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1975)). See also CARR, supra note 6, § 5.9(d)(1), at 5-70.
The second, less drastic position advocates examining the government's behavior to determine
whether the government acted in bad faith and then imposing sanctions flexibly with the statutory
purpose of preventing subterfuge searches in mind. United States v. Orozco, 630 F. Supp. at 1530
(citing United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 31 (Ist Cir. 1983); United States v. Watchmaker, 761
F.2d 1459, 1471 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 856 (3d Cir. 1976); and
United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698, 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)). The third approach provides that
disclosure to the grand jury in violation of § 2517(5) is a technical violation that does not merit the
severe sanctions of dismissal or suppression. United States v. Orozco, 630 F. Supp. at 1530 (citing
United States v. Cardell, 773 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1985) and United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d at
29)). Professor Goldsmith argues that "[t]he only appropriate remedy is exclusion of the evidence."
Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 143. However, since United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974), held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings, "improper" disclo-
sure of plain view interceptions to the grand jury should not result in exclusion of such evidence in a
subsequent trial as long as all prerequisites for admissibility are satisfied before the evidence is of-
fered at trial.
189 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1988); S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2187.
190 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3004 to -3017 (1978 & Supp. 1988); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629-
631 (West Supp. 1989); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 16-15-101 to -104 (1986 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 54-41a to -41t (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1987); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to -556 (1981 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01-.15 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3001 to -3010 (1988 & Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 803-41
to -50 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701 to -6719 (1987 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-2514 to -2519 (1981 & Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1301 to 1312 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1989); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -4B-05 (1984 & Supp. 1988); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626 A.01-.40 (West
1983 & Supp. 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 to -712 (1987 & Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 179.410-.515 (1986 & Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A to B (1986 & Supp. 1988);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156 A-I to -26 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-12-1 to - 1l
(1978 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1989); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51-.66 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 176-177 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721-.739 (1984 & Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, §§ 5701-
5726 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-5.1-1 to -16 (1981 & Supp. 1988); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 23A-35A-1 to -34 (1988); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN., art. 18.20-21
(Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-1 to -16 (1982 & Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.2-61 to -70 (1983 & Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.010 to .140 (1988 & Supp.
1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27 to .37 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-3-601 to -611
(1987).
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to preempt state regulatory authority.' 9 1 Rather, the drafters intended
Title III to establish minimum standards for state surveillance statutes.
Thus, while state law may be more restrictive than the provisions of Title
III, and therefore more protective of individual privacy, state law may not
be less restrictive than the federal statute.19 2 For example, in United States
v. Marion,'9 3 the government argued that state law rather than Title III
governs the issue of whether evidence derived from the execution of
state wiretap orders may be used in federal proceedings.' 9 4 Fearing that
the applicable state law could be construed in a manner less restrictive
than section 2517(5), the court rejected the government's argument:
[W]e believe it clear beyond peradventure that [the government's ar-
gument] runs counter to both the overall scheme and provisions of
Title III. The Act provides the minimum standard against which the
interceptions in question must bejudged.... [Despite the fact the inter-
ceptions were made pursuant to a state court authorization, at the very least the
other requirements of the Title III-including [section] 251 7(5)-must be satis-
fied. But whether the proceedings be federal or state, interpretation of a state
wiretap statute can never be controlling where it might impose requirements less
stringent than the controlling standard of Title III. If a state should set forth
procedures more exacting than those of the federal statute, however,
the validity of the interceptions and the orders of authorization by
which they were made would have to comply with that test as well.' 9 5
B. State Electronic Surveillance Law and the Plain View Doctrine
Most state provisions governing the admissibility of plain view evi-
dence generated by electronic surveillance are essentially identical to Ti-
tle III's.196 Nonetheless, other state statutes are-more restrictive on the
admissibility of plain view interceptions. In four states, intercepted com-
munications relating to crimes other than those specified in the order are
admissible only when the evidence concerns a felony.' 9 7 Statutes in four
191 S. REP. No. 1097,supra note 6, at 2187. "The state statute must meet the minimum standards
reflected as a whole in the proposed chapter. The proposed provision [§ 2516(2)] envisions that
states would be free to adopt more restrictive legislation, or no legislation at all, but not less restric-
tive legislation." Id.
192 I d; 144 CONG. REC. 11206, 11470 (1968) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
193 535 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1976); see supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
194 Id. at 701.
195 Id at 701-02 (emphasis added).
196 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-548(b) (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336(q) (1987); RAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-2515(6) (1981); M.D. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-407(e) (1984 & Supp.
1988); MINN. STAT. § 626A.09 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-704(5) (1987); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:8V (1986); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW ANN. § 700.65(4) (Mckinney 1984); OR.
REV. STAT. § 133.738(5) (1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5718 (Purdon 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-35A-18 (Supp. 1988); TEXAS CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 18.20 sec. 7(e) (Vernon Supp.
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-9(5) (1982 & Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.29(5) (West
1985).
197 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-15-102(16) (1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-45(e) & (f) (Supp.
1987); VA. CODE § 19.2-67(E) (Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 7-3-600(r) (1987). For example, the Vir-
ginia Statute provides:
E. When an investigative or law enforcement officer, or police officer of a county or city,
while engaged in intercepting wire, electronic, or oral communications in the manner au-
thorized herein, or observing or monitoring such interception intercepts, observes or
monitors wire, electronic or oral communications relating to offenses other than those
specified in the order of authorization, the contents thereof, and evidence derived there-
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other states provide that plain view interceptions are inadmissible unless
they relate to a designated offense.1 98 The Nevada statute provides that
communications relating to crimes not particularized in the order are
inadmissible but evidence derived therefrom is admissible. 199 In Penn-
sylvania, plain view interceptions are admissible evidence if noted in a
final report filed with the court at the completion of surveillance.200
Pennsylvania courts interpret the statute to require suppression of evi-
dence not mentioned in the final report only upon the defendant's show-
ing of prejudice due to the omission.201 The Connecticut statute does
not permit intercepted communications relating to crimes not described
in the surveillance order to be used in criminal proceedings; such evi-
dence can be used and disclosed only for investigatory purposes.20 2 The
from, shall not be disclosed or used... unless such communications or derivative evidence relates to
a felony, in which case use of disclosure may be made as provided in subsections A, B [for
investigatory purposes] and C [as evidence in a judicial proceeding] of this section. Such
use and disclosure pursuant to subsection C of this section shall be permitted only when
approved by ajudge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds, on subsequent appli-
cation, that such communications were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provi-
sions of this chapter....
VA. CODE § 19.2-67(E) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
198 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.08(5) (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-64(c) (1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 176.8(E) (West 1983); VA. CODE § 19.2-67(3) (1983). For example, the Florida Statute
provides:
(5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire
or oral communications in the manner authorized herein, intercepts wire or oral communi-
cations relating to offenses for which an order or/sic] authorization or approval could have been secured
pursuant to s. 934.07, other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval,
the contents thereof and evidence derived therefrom may be disclosed or used [for investi-
gatory purposes]. Such contents and any evidence derived therefrom may be used [as evi-
dence in a judicial proceeding] when authorized or approved by a judge of competent
jurisdiction when such judge finds or subsequent application that the contents were other-
wise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be
made as soon as practicable.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.08(5) (1985) (emphasis added).
199 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.465(4) (1986).
4. When an investigative or law enforcement officer engaged in intercepting wire or oral
communications as authorized by [this statute], intercepts wire or oral communications re-
lating to offenses other than those specified in the order.. ., the contents of the communi-
cations and the evidence derived therefrom may be disclosed or used [for investigatory
purposes]. The direct evidence derived from such communications is inadmissible in a
criminal proceeding, but any other evidence obtained as a result of knowledge obtained
from such communications may be disclosed or used [in judicial proceedings] when author-
ized or approved by a justice of the Supreme Court or district judge who finds upon appli-
cation made as soon as practicable that the contents of such communications were
intercepted in accordance with the provisions of [this statute].
Id.
200 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5712(e) (Purdon 1983).
(e) Final report.-Whenever a surveillance is authorized pursuant to this section, a com-
plete written list of names of participants and evidence of offenses discovered, including
those not stated in the application for order, shall be filed with the court at the time author-
ized surveillance is terminated.
Id.
201 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hashem, 525 A.2d 744, 754 (Pa. Super. 1987).
202 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41p(c) & (d) (West 1985).
(c) If an investigative officer, while engaged in interception of wire communications in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter, intercepts wire communications relating to
any crime not specified in the order authorizing such interception, the contents of such
intercepted communications and evidence derived therefrom may be disclosed [for investi-
gatory purposes].
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California statute203 is the most extreme in its restrictions on the use of
plain view interceptions. It provides that intercepted communications
concerning crimes not specified in the original order and evidence de-
rived from them may not be used by officers, except "to prevent the com-
mission of a public offense," and they may not be used in court unless
the evidence "was obtained through an independent source or inevitably
would have been discovered. '20 4
IV. Extending the Plain View Doctrine to Electronic Searches
The different interpretations of section 2517(5) and the varying re-
quirements among state provisions illustrate that opinions differ as to
whether, and to what extent, courts should apply the plain view doctrine
to electronic surveillance. Apparently, three general approaches exist:
(1) the Most Restrictive Approach which holds that it is inappropriate, or
even unconstitutional, to extend the plain view doctrine to electronic
searches; (2) the Less Restrictive Majority Approach which holds that the
plain view doctrine should be given only limited applicability to elec-
tronic searches; and (3) the Constitutional Approach which holds that the
plain view doctrine should apply without restrictions to lawful electronic
searches in the same manner it applies to lawful conventional searches.
This Part argues that state and federal legislatures should adopt the Con-
stitutional Approach and admit plain view interceptions into evidence
without requiring retroactive amendment of the original order or impos-
ing other superfluous restrictions. 20 5
A. The Most Restrictive Approach
Proponents of the most extreme anti-plain view position argue that,
in order to avoid "constitutional problems," courts should apply a per se
exclusionary rule to plain view evidence discovered during electronic
surveillance. 20 6 They reason that electronic searches are inherently more
intrusive of individual privacy than conventional searches, and that the
likelihood of discovering evidence of unparticularized crimes is much
greater with electronic surveillance than with conventional searches.
Therefore, they argue, plain view interceptions cannot meet Coolidge's
(debated) inadvertent discovery requirement, 207 and thus, cannot be
squared with the fourth amendment. Their suggested solution is to al-
(d) Any investigative officer who discloses the contents of any intercepted wire communi-
cation or evidence derived therefrom (1) to any person not authorized to receive such infor-
mation (2) in a manner otherwise than authorized by the provisions of this chapter shall be
guilty of a class D felony.
Id.
203 CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(b) (West Supp. 1989). See infra text accompanying notes 229-34
for the language of the California provision and the absurd results of its application.
204 Id.
205 See infra notes 235-53 and accompanying text.
206 See, e.g., CARR, supra note 6, § 5.9(b), at 5-57 to 5-61 and materials cited therein; Note, Subse-
quent Use of Electronic Suiveillance Interceptions and The Plain View Doctrine: Fourth Amendnent Limitations on
The Omnnibus Crine Control Act, 9 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 529, 553 (1976); FiSHMAN, supra note 6, at 551.
207 Id. See supra note 31 debating the constitutional necessity of Coolidge's inadvertent discovery
requirement.
1990] NOTE
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
low police to use plain view interceptions only for investigatory purposes
while excluding the particular communications and any derivative evi-
dence from the courtroom. This approach purports to avoid perceived
fourth amendment difficulties and to reduce the incentive for investiga-
tors to exceed minimization limitations. 208 Both California 20 9 and Con-
necticut 210 reflect this reasoning in their electronic surveillance statutes.
The Most Restrictive approach is poorly reasoned because: (1) it
ignores the substantial safeguards in Title III that all surveillance statutes
must include to minimize the intrusiveness of electronic surveillance; (2)
it overemphasizes the importance of inadvertent discovery as an element
of the plain view doctrine;211 and (3) it furthers no significant individual
privacy interest while substantially hindering effective law enforcement in
a manner that produces absurd results.
First, the Most Restrictive Approach ignores the substantial privacy
safeguards that Title III requires of all surveillance statutes.21 2 For ex-
ample, Title III requires that an application for a surveillance order must
establish the inadequacy of alternative investigative procedures. 213
Courts characterize this requirement as an "extra protection of privacy,
above and beyond that required by the Fourth Amendment, [which]
manifests the intention of the framers of the statute to ensure that each
wiretap would be not only reasonable, but also necessary. '2 14 Addition-
ally, under Title III and all state surveillance statutes, law enforcement
officers can utilize electronic surveillance to investigate only certain
crimes. 215 Other Title III requirements imposing substantial privacy
safeguards include: the recording requirement;2 16 the minimization re-
quirement;21 7 the termination requirement;218 and the judicial progress
report provision.21 9 These provisions sufficiently compensate for any
greater degree of intrusiveness electronic searches may possess.
Second, the Most Restrictive Approach argues that because of the
greater likelihood of intercepting evidence of crimes not specified in the
order, plain view interceptions can never be truly inadvertent. Under the
208 Id. at 5-60 & 5-61. Professor Carr argues that "[ain automatic exclusionary rule would keep
the particular conversation from evidence, but the officers could still act to prevent future criminal
activity .. ." Id. Unlike the California statute discussed infra notes 229-34, Professor Carr would
admit evidence derived from the inadmissible plain "view interceptions which, as he notes, is the
approach taken by Nevada. Id. (citing NEv. REV. STAT. § 179.465(4) (1986)).
209 CAL. PENAL CODE § 529.32(b) (West Supp. 1989) is discussed infra at notes 229-34 and ac-
companying text.
210 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 54 -41p (West 1985).
211 See supra note 31 debating the necessity of the inadvertent discovery requirement.
212 See supra notes 36-127, 189-95 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) (1988).
214 United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914 (D. Del. 1971).
215 See supra note 77, 189-92 and accompanying text. Admittedly, in any search investigators
hope, or even expect to discover as much criminal evidence as they can, to include evidence of
crimes not described in the warrant. Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 147 n.877 and accompanying text.
This may be especially true with regard to electronic searches. Id. at 147 n.878 and accompanying
text.
216 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
217 See supta notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note I I I and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65:490
modem formulation of the plain view doctrine, 220 however, inadvertent
discovery may not be an essential element of a constitutionally valid plain
view seizure.221 Moreover, while section 2517(5)'s legislative history in-
dicates that plain view interceptions must be made "incidentally" in or-
der to meet the provision's requirements, the courts hold that this
language does not impose an inadvertency requirement. 222
In United States v. McKinnon,223 for example, the First Circuit held
that:
Evidence of crimes other than those authorized in a wiretap warrant
are intercepted "incidentally" when they are the by-product of a bona
fide investigation'of crimes specified in a valid warrant. Congress did
not intend that a suspect be insulated from evidence of one of his ille-
gal activities gathered during the course of a bona fide investigation of
another of his illegal, activities merely because law enforcement agents
are aware of his diversified criminal portfolio. 224
Professor Clifford Fishman asserts that "[t]he First Circuit's reasoning in
McKinnon is consistent with contemporary interpretation of the plain
view doctrine.. .; it is persuasive and ought to be adopted." 225 Further
support for the argument that Coolidge's inadvertency requirement is not
lurking in section 2517(5)'s legislative history is the fact that the
Supreme Court did not decide Coolidge until 1971, three years after Con-
gress enacted Title III. It is highly unlikely that Tide III's drafters antici-
pated Coolidge's inadvertent discovery requirement.
Finally, California and Connecticut's automatic exclusion approach
furthers no significant individual privacy interest that is not protected by
other electronic surveillance limitations. As noted in the commentary to
the ABA Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance:
[T]he privacy of the individual has already been invaded lawfully by
the original search during the course of an investigation for a desig-
nated offense. Formulating a rule which would prevent the use of
[plain view] evidence would not change police conduct in the future or
protect as such citizen privacy. 226
As a means to reduce investigator incentive t6 violate minimization re-
quirements, an automatic exclusion rule would, again, be superfluous. If
investigators fail to "minimize, ' 227 any plain view evidence they intercept
becomes excludable because officers have exceeded the scope of the au-
thorized search. Under all surveillance statutes, failing to meet minimi-
zation standards is grounds for exclusion of intercepted evidence,
220 see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
221 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
222 See, e.g., United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1983) (evidence relating to crimes
not specified in the surveillance order need not be discovered inadvertently or take investigators by
surprise in order for a court to properly authorize disclosure of such evidence pursuant to
§ 2517(5)); United States v. Levine, 690 F. Supp. 1165, 1175 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
223 United States V. McKinnon, 721 F.2d at 22-23.
224 Id
225 FISHMAN, supra note 6, at 339-40 (Supp. 1989).
226 1968 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 145.
227 See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
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including plain view evidence. 228 Minimization and suppression provi-
sions, therefore, provide ample incentive for officers to minimize.
Applying California's electronic surveillance law to a hypothetical
situation illustrates the unfortunate results engendered by a per se exclu-
sionary approach. The California statute provides that:
§ 629.32 INTERCEPTIONS RELATING TO CRIMES NOT SPECIFIED IN ORDER
OF AUTHORIZATION; USE
If a peace officer, while engaged in intercepting wire communica-
tions in the manner authorized by this chapter, intercepts wire com-
munications relating to crimes other than those specified in the order
of authorization ... , the contents thereof, and any evidence derived
therefrom may not be disclosed or used [by peace officers for investi-
gatory purposes], except to prevent the commission of a public offense.
The contents and any evidence derived therefrom may not be used [in
any criminal court or grand jury proceeding], except where the evidence
was obtained through an independent source or inevitably would have
been discovered, and the use is authorized by a judge who finds that
the contents were intercepted in accordance with this chapter. 229
Assume that California peace officers are lawfully executing a prop-
erly issued order authorizing a residential wiretap. The subject is sus-
pected only of importation, possession for sale and sale of cocaine. The
order authorizes interception of the subject's phone conversations relat-
ing only to those offenses. 230 One Saturday at about noon, the officers
intercept a conversation between the subject and a caller who identifies
himself as "the hitman." The hitman says that he is calling from the
phone booth outside the Safeway supermarket on Main Street. Their
conversation reveals that the hitmanjust watched the subject's wife enter
the grocery store and that as previously arranged, the hitman is going to
use the pistol and silencer that the subject gave him to shoot the subject's
wife as she leaves the grocery store. The hitman is then going to put the
body in the trunk of the wife's car, drive it to Steep Cliff just across the
state line in Nevada, and push the car over the edge. The subject says
that he will meet the hitman at Steep Cliff at one o'clock when, as prom-
ised, the subject will give the hitman $100,000 in a brown briefcase and
they will go their separate ways. Before he hangs up, the subject tells the
hitman that he will be glad to finally be rid of "that unfaithful wench."
After inadvertently intercepting this incriminating conversation, the
investigating officers realize they have no time to secure an arrest warrant
and that they must move quickly. The hitman, carrying his pistol and
silencer, is arrested for conspiracy to commit murder as he leaves the
phone booth just ten steps behind the subject's wife. The subject, carry-
ing his brown briefcase filled with $100,000 in twenty-dollar-bills, is ar-
rested after the police follow him to the state line near Steep Cliff.
Since the conversation between the subject and the hitman related
to conspiracy to commit murder and is completely unrelated to the nar-
228 See supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
229 CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(b) (West Supp. 1989).
230 Under the California statute electronic surveillance can be authorized only to investigate nar-
cotics offenses. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02 (West Supp. 1989).
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cotics offenses specified in the order of authorization, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 629.32(b) is the provision governing the use and admissibility of the
contents of the conversation and evidence derived therefrom. Under this
provision it was lawful for the investigators to disclose the contents of the
subject's conversation with the hitman but only in order to prevent the
murder, a "public offense." 23' Nonetheless, the contents of the conver-
sation and all the derivative evidence-the hitman's pistol and the sub-
ject's briefcase and the circumstances under which they were seized-are
inadmissible in any criminal court or grand jury proceeding.
The statute provides that, with respect to plain view interceptions,
"[t]he contents and any evidence derived therefrom may not be used [in
any criminal court or grand jury proceeding] except where the evidence
was obtained through an independent source or inevitably would have
been discovered .... ,,232 The evidence of the murder conspiracy con-
sists of the contents of the plain view interception and evidence derived
solely from that conversation, none of which inevitably would have been
discovered. Furthermore, the California statute does not contain any
provision that would provide a separate basis for admissibility.233 Thus,
the absurd result of applying the Most Restrictive Approach is that none
of the evidence of the conspiracy between the subject and the hitman is
admissible in court.23 4
B. The Less Restrictive Majority Approach
Title III and the majority of state electronic surveillance statutes ex-
tend the plain view doctrine to electronic searches but constrain the doc-
trine's applicability. As discussed, the Less Restrictive Majority
231 CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(b) (West Supp. 1989).
232 Id
233 Unlike Title III's emergency surveillance provision, the California statute authorizes a judge
to retroactively approve emergency surveillance only when there are grounds upon which an order
could be issued. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.06(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989). Conspiracy to commit murder
is not an offense for which a surveillance order can issue under the California statute. See CAL. PENAL
CODE 629.02(a) (West Supp. 1989).
234 If the California provision was applied to the facts in United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972) and United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974) the results would be the same as the results of the provision's appli-
cation to this hypothetical. See infra note 262. When state officers gather evidence using electronic
surveillance that is inadmissible under the state statute but would be admissible under Title III,
there is some authority for gaining admissibility of the evidence in federal court by passing the
evidence to federal law enforcement officers. See CARR, supra note 6, § 7.4(c)(2)(B); Note, United
States v. McNulty: Title III and the Admissibility in Federal Court of Illegally Gathered Evidence, 80 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1714 (1986). One court described the rationale behind this modern revival of the "silver plat-
ter doctrine": "Congress was agreeable to allowing the states to enact measures that were more
strict than the federal law, but was not agreeable to allowing more restrictive state laws to govern
federal prosecutions." CARR, supra note 6, § 7.4(c)(2)(B) (quoting United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d
1243, 1253 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
A split among the United States Courts of Appeals exists over the propriety of admitting in
federal court evidence that could not be lawfully gathered or lawfully disclosed in state court. Eight
circuits (the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth) will not apply state stan-
dards in federal court. See Note, supra, at 1717 n.14, 1724 n.80. Since the Ninth Circuit would not
apply state standards in federal court, the California police officers in the above hypothetical could
turn over all evidence to federal authorities and it would be admissible in federal court provided
federal jurisdiction could be established. Three circuits (the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh) will apply
the state law and require suppression of silver platter evidence. Id. at 1717-18 n.16, 1733 nn.142-51.
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Approach admits plain view interceptions as evidence in judicial pro-
ceedings. However, it imposes procedural prerequisites to admissibil-
ity23 5 or limits admissibility to only those plain view interceptions
relating to a certain list or class of crimes. 23 6
The Majority Approach to the admissibility of plain view intercep-
tions is defective in three ways: (1) the rationale behind the retroactive
amendment procedure has become obsolete under current fourth
amendment plain view jurisprudence so that enforcement of such proce-
dures unnecessarily hampers law enforcement efforts; (2) the amend-
ment process does not afford any privacy protections not protected by
other provisions of surveillance statutes; and (3) little policy basis exists
for limiting admissibility of plain view interceptions to certain crimes as
many Majority Approach states do.
First, these procedural and particular crime limitations on the admis-
sibility of plain view interceptions are no longer constitutionally re-
quired. Therefore they unnecessarily restrict the effectiveness of an
"indispensable aid to law enforcement. '23 7 Considering the modern for-
mulation of the plain view doctrine under Coolidge and Brown, 23 8 Title
III's Marron-based retroactive amendment process in section 2517(5)
and state provisions modeled after it is obsolete 23 9 because such a proce-
dure is no longer necessary to meet fourth amendment standards.
Under Coolidge and Brown, the plain view doctrine requires only a
valid initial intrusion, that the incriminating nature of the item (or com-
munication) seized be immediately apparent, and (arguably) that the dis-
covery be inadvertent. The Constitution imposes these requirements to
ensure that plain view evidence is not admitted unless: (1) the initial in-
trusion is authorized and not just a pretext for gaining access to the item
in plain view; and (2) the investigators were acting within the scope of
their initial authority at the time they made the seizure. Title III's legisla-
tive history indicates that these objectives are the same objectives that
section 2517(5) sought to achieve. 240 As applied in the context of con-
ventional searches, the modern plain view doctrine achieves these objec-
tives without requiring "retroactive amendment" of the warrant
authorizing the initial intrusion. Once these objectives are satisfied, as
one court recognized, "the public interest militates against ignoring what
is in plain view." 24 1
A strict "as soon as practicable" retroactive amendment requirement
merely hinders law enforcement. One court examined the burden of
such a strict requirement:
Such a burden would unduly hamper the government's investigation
of organized crime or otherwise burden busy government staffs with
recording and documenting everything done during every lengthy in-
235 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 197, 198 and accompanying text.
237 See supra text accompanying note 40.
238 See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 129-41 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
241 United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977).
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vestigation for possible use in future court hearings. In view of [sec-
tion 2517(5)'s] stated legislative purpose, Congress could not have
intended to impose such burdens upon law enforcement officers. If
the legislative purpose is fulfilled the government has done what it is
required to do. 24
2
Recognizing the foregoing, many federal courts have liberally construed
section 2517(5)'s requirements almost to the point of ignoring them.243
A logical legislative response is to remove such unnecessary restrictions.
Second, the requirement of prompt retroactive judicial amendment
to the initial order does not provide any extra protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. 24 4 Like the former practice of posting a
guard on the plain view evidence while another officer obtained a second
warrant particularizing the plain view item, the retroactive amendment
requirement is a pro forma procedure that does nothing to narrow the
scope of the search or deter future unconstitutional police conduct. 24 5
Instead, the amendment process merely provides an early judicial review
to determine whether investigators were complying with the applicable
surveillance statute at the time they made the plain view interception.2 46
In other words, the judge must decide whether investigators discovered
the plain view evidence during a lawful search, a task which can be han-
dled equally well at a suppression hearing, once it becomes clear that the
government intends to offer the plain view interceptions as evidence.
Some commentators argue that the amendment procedure was intended
primarily as a means of ensuring judicial supervision of the execution of
surveillance orders. 24 7 On the contrary, judicial supervision was not the
policy underlying section 2517(5); Title III's drafters included the
amendment procedure to comply with the prohibition of plain view
seizures made during a search pursuant to a warrant, a prohibition once
imposed by Marron 24 8 but now obsolete. Moreover, Title III's drafters
provided forjudicial supervision by giving the judge the option of requir-
ing judicial progress reports, 24 9 which serve the supervisory function
more efficiently than the retroactive amendment process.
Finally, in addition to the retroactive amendment requirement, sev-
eral states limit the admissibility of plain view interceptions to only those
communications relating to a felony or an offense that the surveillance
242 United States v. Arnold, 576 F.Supp. 304, 308-09 (N.D. 111. 1988).
243 See supra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
244 Persons not named in the original surveillance order but later included as a result of a
§ 2517(5) amendment would, however, presumably be entitled to post surveillance notice under
§ 2518(8)(d).
245 See infra text accompanying notes 255-56 (explaining the absence of deterrent value in exclud-
ing constitutionally seized plain view evidence as a penalty for failure to comply with the retroactive
amendment requirement or other restrictions on the admissibility of such evidence).
246 More intensive judicial review can be required through judicial insistence on periodic reports
as provided for in provisions such as § 2518(6) which provides "[wjhenever an order authorizing
interception is entered pursuant to this chapter, the order may require reports to be made to the
judge who issued the order showing what progress has been made towards achievement of the au-
thorized objective and the need for continued interception. Such reports shall be made a such inter-
vals as the judge may require." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1988).
247 See CARR, supra note 6, § 5.9(d)(1) at 5-70.
248 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 95.
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statute designates as a proper subject of a surveillance order.250 In these
jurisdictions, plain view evidence acquired by electronic surveillance can
not be used to prosecute any crime that is not enumerated in the elec-
tronic surveillance statute. States that have interpreted or drafted their
statutes to impose such restrictions have done so without any sound pol-
icy justifications. There is no policy reason for restricting otherwise
properly acquired plain view interceptions to those crimes designated by
statute.25 1 Title III's legislative history252 and the 1980 American Bar
Association's Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance 25 3 agree that,
if lawfully obtained, plain view interceptions should be admissible as evi-
dence of any crime.
C. The Constitutional Approach
In contrast to the foregoing approaches which preclude or limit the
admissibility of plain view interceptions, the approach that admits such
evidence without procedural prerequisites or other restrictions emerges
as most logical. Given the present formulation of the plain view doc-
trine 254 and the privacy safeguards already imposed by electronic surveil-
lance statutes,2 55 excluding or limiting the admissibility of plain view
interceptions does not further any significant fourth amendment or pri-
vacy interest. Courts impose the sanction of exclusion when evidence is
unconstitutionally acquired in order to deter future unconstitutional po-
lice conduct and protect the people from further unreasonable searches
and seizures. As long as officers obtain and execute a surveillance order
in compliance with the privacy protections embodied in the authorization
and execution provisions of Title III, any incriminating communications
that they intercept should be admissible evidence. Excluding such inter-
ceptions will not deter future unconstitutional police conduct because
the investigators never conducted themselves outside the fourth amend-
ment in the first instance.
When the intercepting officers do fail to comply with the surveillance
statute, the search is unlawful and plain view evidence derived from the
surveillance should be excluded. Courts can determine the lawfulness of
the electronic search, and the admissibility of plain view interceptions, in
the same manner courts determine the admissibility of the fruits of a con-
ventional search: by holding a suppression hearing after it becomes clear
the plain view interceptions will be offered as evidence. After the
Supreme Court's decisions in Coolidge and Brown, premature admissibility
determinations, such as those required by section 2517(5)'s retroactive
amendment requirement, are merely burdensome red tape and are no
longer necessary.
250 See supra notes 197, 198 and accompanying text.
251 See Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 142 n.847.
252 See S. REP. No. 1097 supra note 6, at 2189.
253 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 2.42 (1980).
254 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 36-127, 189-95 and accompanying text.
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Electronic surveillance statutes, therefore, should be drafted or
amended to include language that permits the disclosure of the contents
of lawfully intercepted plain view evidence in judicial proceedings, re-
gardless of the type of offense the evidence relates to and without impos-
ing unnecessary procedural prerequisites. Two states have incorporated
such language in their statutes. The plain view provisions of the Idaho256
and Louisiana 257 statutes authorize the use and disclosure of the contents
of plain view interceptions, and evidence derived from them, while giving
testimony under oath in any state or federal criminal proceeding. The
Idaho and Louisiana statutes require only that officers obtain the plain
view interception while conducting surveillance in accordance with the
other provisions of the statutes; they are, therefore, consistent with cur-
rent constitutional standards under Coolidge and Brown. The plain view
provisions of the Idaho and Louisiana statutes should serve as a model
for all electronic surveillance statutes.
V. Conclusion
When properly employed, electronic surveillance is an "indispensa-
ble aid to law enforcement," 258 especially in combatting organized crime
which relies heavily on the extensive use of wire and oral communica-
tions for its success. 259 The "real punch" of electronic surveillance stat-
utes is their authorization for the disclosure and use of evidence
"captured by the intercept as though in plain view."' 260 In recent years,
the activities of criminals engaged in drug trafficking have become "more
widespread, organized, and violent." 26 1 Electronic surveillance statutes
can provide an effective means of evidence gathering and at the same
time protect against unreasonable searches. However, the challenge of
organized narcotics-related crime requires that electronic surveillance
256 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6707(5) (1987) reads as follows:
(5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire
or oral communications in the manner authorized herein, intercepts wire or oral communi-
cations relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization, the
1:ontents therefor, and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in
subsections (1), (2) and (3) of this section.
Subsection (3) authorizes the disclosure or use of information concerning properly intercepted wire
and oral communications "while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceed-
ing in any court of this state, of the United States or of any state or in any political subdivision
thereof." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6707(3) (1987).
257 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1309E (Supp. 1989) reads as follows:
E. When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire or
oral communications obtains knowledge of communications relating to offenses other than
those specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and evidence
derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in Subsections A, B and C of this
Section.
Subsection C authorizes the disclosure or use of information concerning properly intercepted wire
or oral communications "while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceed-
ing in any court of the United States or of the state or in any federal or state grand jury proceeding."
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1309C (Supp. 1989).
258 See supra note 40.
259 See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 6, at 2177.
260 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw ANN. § 700.65(4) (McKinney 1984) (Practice Commentary, written by
Joseph W. Bellacosa).
261 Note, Police Tactics, Drug Trafficking, and Gang Violence: Why the No-Knock Warrant is an Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 552, 558, 559-60 (1989).
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statutes allow law enforcement officers to utilize this investigatory tool to
the fullest extent authorized under the Constitution.2 62 It is unnecessary
to hinder the effectiveness of electronic surveillance by imposing proce-
dural prerequisites or other restrictions on the admissibility of plain view
interceptions beyond those imposed by the fourth amendment, and it is
even more absurd to adopt provisions that automatically exclude such
evidence. Therefore, legislatures should draft new statutes or amend un-
262 In 1972, only four years after Title III was enacted, Senator McCellan addressed the Senate
concerning the effectiveness of electronic survillance as a law enforcment weapon for combatting
organized narcotics-related crime. The following is an excerpt from the Congressional Record re-
porting that address.
FAR-REACHING RESULTS OF COURT-AUTHORIZED WIRETAPPING
Mr. McCellan. Mr. President, in 1988, the Senate by a vote of 68 to 12 defeated a
motion to strike title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, a title
of the 1968 act that I sponsored. By this vote, the Senate indicated its approval of the use
of court-authorized and supervised wiretaps and electronic surveillance in the investigation
of certain Federal offenses. Because of the claims and fears of some that title III would be
ineffective or would not stand up to challenges in court, I have attempted to keep this body
informed of significant developments in the use of wiretaps and electronic surveillance, so
that we all might be able to judge the results of our work.
On December 1 of last year, I was pleased to inform the Senate that in its first major
Federal appellate review, title III was sustained as constitutional. On October 13, 1971, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Cox v. United States, No. 71-1043, specifi-
cally upheld the legal reasoning behind and justification for Title III.
The issue before the court in the Cox case was the right of the Government to use
information concerning a robbery, which had been incidentally obtained during the course
of a lawfully authorized and executed narcotics wiretap. The court upheld the statutory
scheme, which provides for retroactive judicial approval for such incidentally intercepted
communications. In so doing, Judge Doyle stated:
In electronic surveillance of organized criminals involved in gambling, information might be inter-
cepted disclosing a conspiracy to commit murder. Surely the officials must be empowered to use this infor-
mation notwithstanding the lack of specific prior authorization.
Mr. President, to show the far-reaching and successful results of this one wiretap, I
should like to bring to the Senate's attention additional facts in the Cox case as revealed by
aJuly 30, 1971, full-page article in the Kansas City Star, an article which has only just been
drawn to my attention.
According to this article, from January 1969, through May 1970, an organized group
called by law enforcement officials a "Black Mafia" conducted "virtually 100 percent of the
narcotics traffic and controlled much of the loan-sharking, gambling, prostitution, and bur-
glary on Kansas City's East Side," carried out several bank robberies, had an estimated
gross income of upwards of$100,000 a day, in the course of its diabolical operations killed
at least 20 women and men, and were planning further killings when the leaders were finally
incarcerated. Further, the article states:
The Kansas City Black Mafia had ties with many other cities around the country. Asked ifthe gang
could have operated for the length of time and with the efficiency it did without the assistance to some
persons in law enforcement, a highly placed federal sourced said it definitely could not.
The organization's murder victims were people who refused to join the organization,
who owed money or were suspected of being police informants. At least two of these vic-
tims were tortured before they were killed. Youths were recruited from the street to carry
out robberies. These young men were often heavy narcotics users, who were supplied with
weapons, given instructions, and forced to turn over some or all of the loot to the organiza-
tion. Sometimes they were beaten out of what was to have been their share of the robbery
proceeds. We can thus see how such an organization can ensnare susceptible youths into
the most despicable and inhuman sort of life. But not only were young hoodlums reached
by this gang: one of the regular targets for the organization's narcotics trade were the
soldiers at Fort Riley.
By the beginning of 1970, Government agents knew a great deal about the nature and
extent of the organization's operations, but "hard evidence was needed before they could
secure indictments." After a series of incidents involving informants, infiltration, and plans
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necessarily restrictive provisions so that courts can begin to hear more
criminal conversations in plain view.
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for more killing, on April 30, 1970, agents received authorization to place a wire tap on the
phone of one of the gang's three leaders. This is what the paper says about that wire tap:
The wire tap proved to be the key that broke the case, for in addition to recording enough information
on narcotics activity to warrant indictments, agents also overhead plans to rob the Southgate State Bank
and a scheme to murder one of the pushers.
The repercussions of this one wire tap were far-reaching. Four men, bank robbers,
were arrested and subsequently convicted. Fourteen narcotic convictions and one for as-
sault of a Federal officer were obtained.
The wire tap also revealed plans to murder a pusher for shooting large quantities of the
narcotics he was meant to sell. The intended victim was taken into private custody and
agreed to testify for the Government. It was learned that a price of $10,000 was put on this
man's head.
With the wire tap evidence and testimony of the pusher, the leaders of the gang were
arrested. The tenacity of these men is shown by one fact that this was not the end of their
evil-doing, for there were plottings from within jail and further killings of potential infor-
mants. But now 19 convictions have been obtained, including the convictions of the three
leaders on various charges. This indescribably evil organization, Mr. President, has been
thwarted by one wire tap.
Surely the case is a vivid demonstration of the worth of title III and the good it can do
to end crime that nothing else can achieve. This one case alone vindicates the Senate's
1988 judgment that the motion to strike title II should have been defeated.
118 Cong. Rev. S. 4903-06 (daily ed. March 28, 1972). See also United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918, rehd denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). The plain view interceptions in the
Cox cases made a significant contribution to the convictions that destroyed the Cox organization. If
the wiretap in Cox were installed under a California surveillance order, the plain view interceptions
relating to robbery and conspiracy to commit murder would be inadmissible under current Califor-
nia surveillance law.
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